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Epidemics are the result of the actions of multiple actors, which 
necessitates a comprehensive allocation of responsibility. However, the 
traditional framework for responsibility, as well as the emerging norm of the 
responsibility to protect, are inadequate for addressing epidemics. Both 
perpetuate the fallacy that states can, on their own, cope with the increased 
incidence of epidemics and fail to adequately allocate responsibility. 
Given these limitations, this Article argues for a new vision of 
responsibility. It develops the theory underlying the norm of common but 
differentiated responsibility and makes the case for expansion of this framework 
to the challenges posed by highly-infectious diseases. This Article articulates the 
distinctive normative bases for differentiating responsibilities based on need, 
culpability, and capacity. The framework developed herein better distributes 
responsibility and is less state-centric than rival norms. It accounts for structural 
inequality in ways that other frameworks do not. Further, it does not reify the 
false hierarchy between civil and political rights and economic and social rights 
that exists in other frameworks. It recognizes and accounts for the significant 
role of nonstate actors and provides a basis for holding such actors responsible, 
as opposed to the nonattribution of responsibility that exists. 
There is reason for cautious optimism about the prospects of success of this 
framework. First, it is consistent with theoretical and existing foundations of law 
where responsibility is tethered to an actor’s conduct and relationship to the 
harm through culpability. However, the framework does not treat the culpability 
model as a legal straitjacket and envisions a broad understanding of causation—
direct, indirect, and historical. Additionally, the framework differentiates based 
on capacity, which is derived from human rights and global public health law. It 
also draws on extralegal incentives, building on moral and political 
conceptualizations of responsibility towards those in need. The common but 
differentiated responsibility framework is likely to gain approval and assist 
rapidly with the battle against epidemics. In fact, elements of it are already 
reflected in state practice. In sum, the theoretical framework developed in this 
Article serves not only to provide useful guidance to actors in the face of 
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epidemics but also to shift extant conceptualizations of responsibility in 
significant ways. 
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I. Introduction 
Worldwide highly-infectious diseases reflect global inequities: they 
make up five of the top ten leading causes of death in low-income countries, 
while constituting only one of the top ten causes of death in high-income 
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countries.1 Cholera is an infectious disease that impacts the poorest of the 
poor,2 and like other highly-infectious diseases marked by poverty, such as 
Ebola, it has received inadequate attention. Cholera is now endemic in many 
countries.3 Yet endemic outbreaks of Cholera are distinguished from 
epidemics, wherein a significant increase of cases occurs in an area.4 While 
Cholera seems to have a relatively long and stable relationship with 
humankind,5 major epidemics generally do not occur in the Global North6 but 
continue to happen in the Global South. For example, in 1961 a Cholera 
pandemic began in Indonesia and spread to six continents,7 touching South 
Asia (1963), Africa (1970), Latin America (1991), and the Caribbean 
(2010).8 Peru’s outbreak took place 100 years after the disease had been 
eliminated from South America; its spread across the continent led to the 
death of 10,000 people.9 Yemen is currently facing the largest documented 
Cholera epidemic in modern times, with over a million cases suspected and 
over 2,300 deaths reported.10 
Highly-infectious diseases typically do not respect borders, posing 
transnational challenges that require cooperation and action through law. 
 
1. The Top 10 Causes of Death, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 24, 2018), http://www.who.int 
/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/the-top-10-causes-of-death [https://perma.cc/UC7P-2G5X] (noting 
that in low-income countries the list is as follows: lower respiratory infections (1), diarrhoeal 
diseases (2), HIV/AIDS (4), malaria (6), and tuberculosis (7), while in high-income countries the 
list includes only lower respiratory infections (6)). 
2. Cholera Fact Sheet, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 1, 2018), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs107/en/ [https://perma.cc/8TDB-Z7ST] [hereinafter 
Cholera Fact Sheet] (noting that Cholera is an “indicator of inequity and lack of social 
development”). 
3. Id. (defining endemic as when Cholera cases are detected for the past three years through 
evidence of local transmission). 
4. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PRINCIPLES OF EPIDEMIOLOGY IN 
PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 1–72 (3d ed. 2012), https://www.cdc.gov/ophss/csels/dsepd 
/ss1978/lesson1/section11.html [https://perma.cc/T6VP-7GG4] (“Epidemic refers to an increase, 
often sudden, in the number of cases of a disease above what is normally expected in that population 
in that area.”). 
5. See Rita R. Colwell, Global Climate and Infectious Disease: The Cholera Paradigm, 274 
SCI. 2025, 2025 (1996) (describing the origin and early occurrences of Cholera). 
6. This author uses the terms Global North and Global South to describe divisions that exist 
between the developed North and the less developed South, but these characterizations oversimplify 
and paper over wide diversity that exists in each category. 
7. Dalong Hu et al., Origins of the Current Seventh Cholera Pandemic, 113 PNAS E7730, 
E7730 (2016); Cholera Fact Sheet, supra note 2. 
8. Francois-Xavier Weill et al., Genomic History of the Seventh Pandemic of Cholera in Africa, 
358 SCI. 785, 785 (2017). 
9. Cholera’s Seven Pandemics, CBC NEWS (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.cbc.ca/news 
/technology/cholera-s-seven-pandemics-1.758504 [https://perma.cc/YE7V-F3NA]. 
10. Weekly Epidemiological Bulletin: Cholera Response in Yemen, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
(July 7, 2018), http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/yemen/week_26.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma 
.cc/KGK2-Q54Z]. 
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This was witnessed with HIV/AIDS, where one case in 195911 led to 36.9 
million people worldwide living with the disease by the end of 2017.12 
Indeed, due to the increasing interconnectedness of the world and the 
influence of a warming climate on the spread of highly-infectious diseases, 
previously obscure viruses are unlikely to be contained to the periphery. As 
old infectious diseases increase in incidence and geographic distribution, or 
reemerge where they were previously under control, new epidemics continue 
to surface. Further, there is increasing resistance to current drugs. 
Accordingly, epidemics force us to consider: Who is responsible for 
combating highly-infectious diseases? How should that responsibility be 
allocated? What should such responsibility look like? These questions are 
especially important for vulnerable countries that are not able to cope with 
epidemic disease. 
In January 2010, a massive earthquake hit Haiti, killing thousands, 
leaving hundreds of thousands homeless, and devastating already weak 
infrastructure in the country. The earthquake created ripe conditions for 
Cholera. Nepalese peacekeepers that were part of the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti introduced the virus in October 2010 near the 
Arbonite River, a main source of drinking water in Haiti.13 The source of the 
initial outbreak is no longer disputed; the viral strain in Haiti’s river was a 
“perfect match” to the Nepali strain.14 Due to poor sanitation conditions, a 
twenty-eight-year-old Haitian man became exposed to Cholera while using 
the river near the peacekeepers’ camp;15 he died shortly thereafter. Scientists 
 
11. AIDS Inst., Where Did HIV Come From?, https://www.theaidsinstitute.org/education/aids-
101/where-did-hiv-come-0 [https://perma.cc/DGM5-SJ6G] (explaining that the earliest known case 
was detected in 1959 from a man in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that how he became 
infected is unknown). 
12. UNAIDS, FACT SHEET—JULY 2018: 2017 GLOBAL HIV STATISTICS 1 (2018), 
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/UNAIDS_FactSheet_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QBE9-DVE2]. 
13. See, e.g., Sarah Cassidy-Seyoum, United Nations Being Sued for Haitian Cholera 
Outbreak, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (July 15, 2014), http://www.coha.org/united-
nations-being-sued-for-haitian-cholera-outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/37ES-3SLG]. 
14. Philip Alston, Extracting Accountability: Special Rapporteurs and the United Nations’ 
Responsibility for Cholera in Haiti 8 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-10, Feb. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3125084 [https://perma.cc/GVD7-6QYW]; see also William Booth, U.N. 
Troops Assaulted, Blamed for Outbreak, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/15/AR2010111507227.html [https://perma.cc/F5PP-MNA7] 
(identifying the Cholera strain as originating from South Asia). 
15. See, e.g., Daniele Lantagne et al., The Cholera Outbreak in Haiti: Where and How Did It 
Begin? (identifying the first victim of the outbreak), in CHOLERA OUTBREAKS 145, 160 (G. 
Balakrish Nair & Yoshifumi Takeda eds., 2014); R.R. Frerichs et al., Nepalese Origin of Cholera 
Epidemic in Haiti, 18 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION E158, E159 (2012) (explaining the 
Nepalese peacekeeper connection to the Cholera outbreak); see also ALEJANDRO CRAVIOTO ET AL., 
FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN HAITI 
4, 27 (2011), http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/5DWT-MNAP] (same). The panel members updated their findings two years after the release of 
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labeled him “Patient Zero” because members of his family who assisted with 
his burial became ill themselves.16 Within a year, approximately 4,000 people 
had died from Cholera.17 The contamination resulted in an epidemic in Haiti 
that has caused the death of 9,603 people and the infection of over 812,000 
people at the time of writing.18 The epidemic in Haiti raises crucial questions 
about responsibility. 
Comparable questions also arose during the largest Ebola epidemic in 
history, which occurred in 2014–2015 in West Africa. Epidemiologists 
identified Emile Ouamouno as “Patient Zero.” Emile was a two-year-old 
child in Guinea when he got infected with a mysterious fever that spread to 
his family members, a rural health facility, a health worker’s funeral, and—
through related familial, social, and trading networks—to the Liberian, 
Guinean, and Sierra Leonean borders.19 This pattern—where an infected 
person goes to an under-resourced health facility without clean needles, a 
supply of gloves, or other necessities for successful treatment and 
containment of the disease, rendering both the patient and healthcare 
providers vulnerable and susceptible to transmission—resulted in the Ebola 
virus inevitably being transmitted.20 Gaps in core capacities were especially 
pronounced in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone21 because, concomitant 
with structural factors, the subregion had a recent history of conflicts and 
narrow post-conflict reconstruction, which cumulatively hollowed out the 
health sector.22 Due in part to the role of international laws and institutions, 
 
the initial report. It states, “[T]he preponderance of the evidence and the weight of the circumstantial 
evidence does lead to the conclusion that personnel associated with the . . . facility were the most 
likely source of introduction . . . .” Lantagne et al., supra, at 162. 
16. Radio Interview by Marco Werman with Dr. Louise Ivers, Brigham & Women’s Hosp. 
(Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/cholera_haiti_newdev37a.html [https://perma.cc 
/FHV9-2GY5]. 
17. E.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Incentives, Compensation, and Irreparable Harm, in 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 148 (André Nollkaemper & 
Dov Jacobs eds., 2015). 
18. Epidemiological Update: Cholera, PAN-AM. HEALTH ORG. & WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 
6, 2018), https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&categor 
y_slug=cholera-2219&alias=45805-6-august-2017-cholera-epidemiological-update-805&Itemid 
=270&lang=en [https://perma.cc/47N5-L2E6]. 
19. Bahar Gholipour, Ebola ‘Patient Zero’: How Outbreak Started from Single Child, LIVE SCI. 
(Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.livescience.com/48527-ebola-toddler-patient-zero.html [https://perma 
.cc/4CAY-5A3W]. 
20. Daniel G. Bausch & Lara Schwarz, Outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea: Where 
Ecology Meets Economy, PLOS NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES, July 2014, at 1, 4. 
21. See, e.g., Steven J. Hoffman, Making the International Health Regulations Matter: 
Promoting Compliance Through Effective Dispute Resolution (noting that many countries did not 
meet the WHO’s International Health Regulations’ 2012 implementation deadline and thus 
requested extensions to scale-up their pandemic preparedness), in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 239, 239 (Simon Rushton & Jeremy Youde eds., 2015). 
22. Matiangai Sirleaf, Ebola Does Not Fall from the Sky: Structural Violence and International 
Responsibility, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 477, 501–02 (2018). 
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these states lacked the capacity to prevent the domestic and transnational 
spread of the disease.23 The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates 
that this outbreak resulted in 28,616 cases of Ebola and 11,310 deaths in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea alone.24 
This Article uses the Cholera and Ebola epidemics to demonstrate the 
limitations of the law of responsibility for addressing epidemics. Both 
epidemics are ideal for this study because they resulted in a lack of 
responsibility. While the Cholera epidemic implicates clear lines of 
causation, the Ebola epidemic involves more diffuse and indirect lines of 
causation. Both involve structural factors, multiple actors, as well as 
historical and more contemporary action. The case studies of the Ebola and 
Cholera epidemics demonstrate quite vividly why conventional and 
emerging responsibility frameworks fail to find purchase in the context of 
global public health. 
This Article argues that a common conceptualization of responsibility is 
necessary to effectively deal with highly-infectious diseases given their 
potential to become worldwide pandemics. It maintains that the traditional 
framework for responsibility, as well as the emerging norm of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P)25 are inadequate for addressing challenges 
posed by epidemics. This Article proposes a common but differentiated 
responsibility (CBDR)26 framework to fight highly-infectious diseases. It 
recommends this as a new vision of shared responsibility for epidemics. 
This Article recommends a common but differentiated framework of 
responsibility to: 
(1) recognize special situations of need in one or more countries with 
epidemic diseases; 
(2) assign greater responsibility to those who have contributed more 
to an epidemic; and 
(3) assign greater responsibility to those who have more resources or 
capacity to deal with an epidemic. 
 
23. See id. at 492–95 (positing that reform policies of international institutions led directly to 
instability in the region, which more easily allowed for the spread of disease). 
24. Ebola Outbreak: 2014–2015, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 10, 2016), 
http://who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en/ [https://perma.cc/685K-3FJX]. 
25. R2P is a set of principles based on the idea that sovereignty is not a right, but a 
responsibility, and that where a state fails to protect its people from mass atrocities, the international 
community has the responsibility to intervene. For further discussion, see generally INT’L COMM’N 
ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2UW-2AQT] 
[hereinafter R2P REPORT]. 
26. See generally CTR. FOR INT’L SUSTAINABLE DEV. LAW, THE PRINCIPLE OF COMMON BUT 
DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES: ORIGINS AND SCOPE (2002), 
http://cisdl.org/public/docs/news/brief_common.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CDP-2V4J] [hereinafter 
CBDR: ORIGINS AND SCOPE]. 
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It develops the framework of CBDR and extends and applies it to  
highly-infectious diseases in a way that directly addresses the shortcomings 
of existing responsibility paradigms. First, both the traditional principles of 
responsibility and R2P perpetuate the fallacy that states can cope with 
structural problems on their own, including the increased incidence of 
epidemics. The framework developed herein better distributes responsibility 
and is less state-centric than rival norms. Additionally, it does not reify the 
false hierarchy between civil and political rights and economic and social 
rights that exists in other frameworks. It also recognizes and accounts for the 
significant role of nonstate actors and provides a basis for holding such actors 
responsible, as opposed to the lack of responsibility that otherwise exists. 
While some scholarship exists on responsibility for highly-infectious 
diseases,27 few have sought to relate this to why extant approaches to 
responsibility should be reconceptualized.28 This author does so, drawing 
widely on criminal law, tort, and remedies principles to formulate the core 
argument that existing frameworks are insufficient to address global public 
health threats like highly-infectious diseases. This Article develops the theory 
underpinning CBDR as a framework based on insights gleaned from its 
application to the Cholera and Ebola epidemics. It develops a theoretical 
framework of responsibility for epidemics (an area where international 
consensus exists on its salience), cognizant that this framework could be 
expanded and applied to cover more diseases and adapted to apply to other 
fields outside of global public health in the future. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part II covers the legal 
framework—examining global public health law, human rights law, and the 
law of responsibility. Additionally, it demonstrates that the emerging norm 
of R2P represents an incomplete vision of responsibility and is inadequate to 
combat epidemics. Part III proposes the expansion of common but 
differentiated responsibility and develops a framework for battling 
epidemics. Part IV discusses the theoretical and policy implications of this 
Article—resolving inter- and intra-axis conflicts within the framework and 
exploring the limits of diffusion, as well as the issues raised with 
 
27. See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horsemen: Emerging Infectious Diseases 
and International Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771, 776 (1997) (arguing that current WHO proposals for 
revising extant international law in order to combat infectious diseases are inadequate and offering 
an alternative); Laurence Gostin & Katharina E. Ó Cathaoir, Lurching from Complacency to Panic 
in the Fight Against Dangerous Microbes: A Blueprint for a Common Secure Future, 67 EMORY 
L.J. 337, 341–42 (2018) (proposing a new plan for global health preparedness, which emphasizes 
shared, transnational responsibility and focuses on WHO reform); Rhett Larson, Law in the Time of 
Cholera, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1271, 1277 (2017) (addressing the issues of “silo thinking” and 
“attenuated decision-making” in transforming global water health). 
28. See generally DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17 
(examining the faults of the international system in its apportionment of responsibilities among 
states and calling for reform and further development in the area). 
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operationalizing CBDR in hard and soft law. The CBDR framework is broad 
enough to resonate with diverse actors and assist quickly in fighting  
highly-infectious diseases. For example, the Global Health Security Agenda 
(GHSA) is currently working to address threats posed by highly-infectious 
diseases through voluntary commitments made by members.29 This initiative 
incorporates elements of the CBDR framework by differentiating based on 
capacity and need.30 As such, elements of the framework are already reflected 
in state practice. This Article serves not only to provide useful guidance to 
actors in the face of epidemics but also to shift existing paradigms of 
responsibility in novel ways. 
II. Legal Framework 
States use international law and institutions to achieve common aims, 
solve shared problems, promote compliance with norms, reduce transaction 
costs, provide information, and coordinate orderly and peaceful dispute 
resolution. States also utilize international law to confront problems that 
overwhelm and transcend traditional boundaries. International law 
increasingly addresses every type of human activity, including those typically 
considered within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states—like public 
health and the treatment and prevention of epidemics. Prevention of 
epidemics is a shared concern of states. However, states have differential 
capacity to prevent and manage epidemics.  
The legal framework for addressing pandemics is spread across multiple 
regimes. Global public health law is the most specific field regulating 
epidemics. The framework for determining responsibility for violations that 
arise during epidemics is governed by human rights law, while the regime for 
allocating responsibility for epidemics is located under principles of 
responsibility. Reconceptualizing responsibility is a project reflected in 
burgeoning shared responsibility norms like R2P. The below subparts 
indicate the limitations of each of these fields for combating epidemics and 
demonstrate why a new vision of shared responsibility is necessary. 
A. Responsibility for Combating Epidemics in Global Public Health and 
Human Rights Law 
  
 1. Responsibility for Combating Epidemics in Global Public Health.—
The primary regime for regulating disease is global public health law. The 
International Health Regulations of 2005 (Regulations)31 is the core 
 
29. About, GLOB. HEALTH SEC. AGENDA, https://www.ghsagenda.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/5ESF-WEDN] [hereinafter GHSA About]. 
30. Id. 
31. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2d ed. 
2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS], http://apps.who.int/iris 
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instrument. Its main purpose is to “prevent, protect against, control and 
provide a public health response to the international spread of disease . . . .”32 
The Regulations create a system of state surveillance and notification for 
certain infectious diseases, which would then trigger an international 
response.33 The Regulations articulate the procedures and framework for 
emergency decision-making in the event of a public health emergency of 
international concern.34 
Global public health law assigns principal responsibility for 
implementing health measures to combat highly-infectious diseases to 
national authorities and component parts.35 The Regulations provide that 
states are to develop better functioning health systems to detect disease, 
surveil, report, verify, and respond, among others.36 The state-centric nature 
of the Regulations fails to adequately recognize the structural conditions in 
the international system that give rise to states needing to develop core 
capacities. It is of limited utility because it does not assist with determining 
responsibility beyond the affected states. It also does not assist with how 
responsibility for capacity-building should be allocated. Overall, global 
public health law is an incomplete regime for conceptualizing and allocating 
global responsibility for combating epidemics. 
 
2. Responsibility for Combating Epidemics in Human Rights Law.—
Another important framework for addressing epidemics is human rights law. 
Under it, states have three kinds of duties—to respect (not to intrude on 
rights), to protect (to restrain third parties from violating rights), and to fulfill 
(requiring states to help realize positive rights).37 The Ebola and Cholera 
epidemics implicate several fundamental human rights, including protections 
against the arbitrary deprivation of life38 and the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.39 
 
/bitstream/handle/10665/43883/9789241580410_eng.pdf;jsessionid=67DAC5BDF849A34F3E1D
EB9A962A1CEB?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/J959-MYGS] (“[T]he Constitution of WHO 
confers upon the World Health Assembly the authority to adopt regulations ‘designed to prevent 
the international spread of disease’ . . . .”). 
32. Id. art. 2. 
33. Id. arts. 5–6. 
34. Id. arts. 12–17, 48–49. 
35. Id. art. 4. 
36. Id. Annex I.A (detailing the core capacity requirements for surveillance and response). 
37. E.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights) ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General 
Comment No. 14]. 
38. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 1996, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“Every human being has the inherent right to life.”). 
39. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12(1), Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize 
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Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
affected states are to take primary responsibility to prevent, treat, and control 
epidemic diseases.40 
Additionally, a fundamental principle of economic, social, and cultural 
rights is that a state should “undertake[] to take steps . . . to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively” the right to 
health as well as other economic, social, and cultural rights.41 “When the 
State has taken all reasonable steps to the maximum of its available resources, 
but for reasons beyond its control . . . is still unable to implement its 
obligations, then it bears no responsibility . . . .”42 It is more likely that human 
rights bodies will find states to be unwilling and in violation of their 
obligations as opposed to unable in the vast majority of cases.43 This is 
because even where resources are strained, a state cannot justify 
noncompliance with any of its core obligations, which include the provision 
of essential levels of healthcare.44 The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the enforcement body responsible for interpreting the 
Covenant on these rights, has found that a state claiming that it is unable to 
carry out its obligations for reasons beyond its control has the burden of 
proof.45 Further, that state must also demonstrate that it has unsuccessfully 
sought to obtain international support.46 Thus, human rights law does not 
absolve states that are incapable from responsibility; instead, it requires that 
they progressively develop capabilities to secure socioeconomic rights. 
Given the above, it should be the rare case that a state affected by an epidemic 
would be able to shield itself from responsibility.47 
Nonetheless, states and other international actors tend to perceive civil 
and political rights violations as more severe and deserving of responsibility 
and action. Thus, no matter how prolonged or systematic socioeconomic 
violations are, these violations tend to “recede drably into the background” 
without external obligation or action.48 In part, this is due to the erroneous 
position that determining accountability for breaches of civil and political 
 
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.”). 
40. Id. art. 12(2)(c). 
41. Id. art. 2. 
42. ARNE VANDENBOGAERDE, TOWARDS SHARED ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: LAW, PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES 216 (2016). 
43. Id. at 218. 
44. General Comment No. 14, supra note 37, ¶¶ 43, 47. 
45. Id. ¶ 47. 
46. See id. (“[The State] has the burden of justifying that every effort has nevertheless been 
made to use all available resources at its disposal . . . .”). 
47. VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 42, at 218. 
48. Benjamin Authers & Hilary Charlesworth, The Crisis and the Quotidian in International 
Human Rights Law, 2013 NETHERLANDS Y.B. OF INT’L L. 19, at 30. 
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rights is more straightforward than for economic and social rights.49 Some 
countries have not recognized socioeconomic rights as legally binding 
primary obligations.50 Accordingly, violations of socioeconomic rights are 
perceived as less amenable to attribution of responsibility and subsequent 
accountability efforts. This neglect of the importance of the economic and 
social sector in international law has rendered already vulnerable countries 
in the Global South ill-equipped to deal with public health crises posed by 
epidemics. 
While the Committee has held that “all members of society—
individuals, including health professionals, families, local communities, 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, civil society 
organizations, as well as the private business sector—have responsibilities 
regarding the realization of the right to health,”51 this is not reflected in 
people’s lived experiences. Only state parties to the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights are accountable for compliance with it.52 While 
states’ international obligations include ensuring that their actions as 
members of international institutions take due account of the right to health,53 
this does not always occur. Unfortunately, the law on the books is not always 
reflected in reality. For example, state actors tend to regard economic and 
social rights as territorial,54 even though the Committee has found that 
member states are also to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other 
countries.55 The Committee has stipulated that states are also to prevent third 
parties from violating the right to health in other countries if states are able 
to influence third parties by way of legal or political means that do not 
conflict with other international obligations.56 The Committee has also 
opined that state parties should provide an environment that facilitates the 
discharge of responsibilities on the right to health.57 Yet, this similarly does 
not pertain. One of the salient issues that arises when the obligation to realize 
 
49. Id. at 31–32 (noting that economic and social rights were not perceived as justiciable nor 
capable of precise definition, which led to the creation of two separate covenants: one focusing on 
civil and political rights, and the other on economic, social, and cultural rights). 
50. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/P6N6-KH6P] (reporting that the Covenant has 169 state 
parties but that, notably, the United States, Palau, the Comoros, and Cuba have not ratified the 
treaty). 
51. General Comment No. 14, supra note 37, ¶ 42. 
52. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 39, art. 2 (requiring the state parties to take steps to realize 
the rights recognized in the Covenant). 
53. General Comment No. 14, supra note 37, ¶ 39. 
54. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 112 (July 9). 
55. General Comment No. 14, supra note 37, ¶ 39. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
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the right to health shifts to the international community is that “an 
undistributed duty . . . to which everybody is subject is likely to be 
discharged by nobody unless it can be allocated in some way.”58 
Human rights law is an inadequate regime for conceptualizing and 
allocating responsibility for epidemics. First, the hyper-prioritization of the 
protection of civil and political rights over social and economic rights 
frustrates efforts aimed at combating highly-infectious diseases. Human 
rights law assigns responsibility for combating epidemics to the affected state 
primarily and to everyone else secondarily. This presents substantial 
challenges for providing full redress for violations witnessed with epidemics. 
The law of responsibility hypothetically fills the gaps where the above 
regimes leave off, but the next section demonstrates its limitations. 
B. Allocating Responsibility for Epidemics 
When dealing with indivisible harms like epidemics, there are inevitable 
challenges in attributing responsibility under traditional principles because it 
is difficult to determine what specific actor caused the exact action that 
subsequently produced a definite aspect of the damage witnessed.59 
Indivisible harms can be caused by governments—acting individually or 
collectively—international and regional organizations, civil society, 
corporations, community-based actors, and individuals, amongst others.  
Yet, conventional understandings locate responsibility solely at the level 
of the state.60 The traditional view of state responsibility under Article 2 of 
the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts holds that states are responsible only 
for conduct attributable to them through action or omission.61 The general 
rule is that conduct is attributable to the state when it is committed by an 
organ of the government or when a person or entity is acting as an agent of 
the state and exercising elements of governmental authority.62 However, a 
state can also be responsible to the extent it fails to take necessary measures 
to prevent harm, imposing a standard of due diligence.63  
States generally resist principles of responsibility that would hold them 
responsible for conduct other than their own—whether those other actors are 
 
58. DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 98 (2007). 
59. Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model, SOC. 
PHIL. & POL’Y, Jan. 2006, at 102, 115. 
60. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 42–43 (2001) 
[hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility of States]. 
61. Id. at 34. 
62. Id. at 45. 
63. See generally Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341 
(2010) (providing a framework for determining when a state must protect someone from a third 
party). 
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private, international organizations, or other state actors.64 The way the 
International Law Commission attempts to deal with situations where there 
are multiple state actors responsible for wrongdoing is unsatisfactory. It does 
not clarify how responsibility is to be allocated.65 Moreover, states are no 
longer the only relevant actors in the international order. The law of 
responsibility obscures the activities of international organizations, as well 
as other nonstate actors and the harm that results from their actions. 
Accordingly, “responsibility gaps”66 can occur in many ways. First, a 
responsibility gap may persist during pandemics because it is not obvious 
who should respond. This may lead to a bystander effect where no actor 
responds.67 A responsibility gap may also occur because the individual 
actions of multiple actors may be distributed in a way that does not meet the 
legal requirements, which provide that responsibility is only assigned to 
actors whose individual contributions are significant enough to pass the 
minimum threshold.68 Notably, in other areas of law, problems of 
overdetermination69 are dealt with by a number of doctrines—joint and 
several liability in tort law and joint criminal enterprise in international 
criminal law, by way of example.70 These principles have not been 
 
64. André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs, Shared Responsibility in International Law: A 
Conceptual Framework, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 359, 386 (2013). 
65. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 60, at 124–25 (explaining that the 
extent of responsibility is sometimes addressed in treaties, but otherwise not clarifying how 
responsibility is allocated). 
66. See, e.g., André Nollkaemper, Political Economy and the Responsibility of States: The 
Problem of Many Hands in International Law (describing how diffusion of responsibility can lead 
to situations where responsibility is unclear, leading to so-called “responsibility gaps”), in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 278, 289 (Alberta 
Fabbricotti ed., 2016). 
67. See Hakimi, supra note 63, at 344–45 (explaining how the lack of a framework leads to 
confusion regarding responsibility and how the proposed framework helps decision makers identify 
when an actor should be responsible). 
68. See Nollkaemper, supra note 66, at 290 (explaining that one likely reason for diffusion of 
responsibility is that the legal conditions for responsibility are not met). 
69. For further discussion, see Jonathan Schaffer, Overdetermining Causes, 114 PHIL. STUD. 
23, 23 (2003) (explaining and giving an example of what an overdetermining cause is). 
70. For further discussion, see Nollkaemper & Jacobs, supra note 64, at 423 (discussing the 
substantive and procedural challenges with applying the private-law principle of joint and several 
responsibility into a public international law context); id. at 425 (discussing the challenges with 
applying the principle of joint criminal enterprise to determining the responsibility of states and 
international organizations, given the need to demonstrate mens rea and other concepts); see also 
Roger P. Alford, Apportioning Responsibility Among Joint Tortfeasors for International Law 
Violations, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 233, 239–40 (2011) (relating domestic tort law concepts to challenges 
of apportioning responsibility for international law violations); Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal 
Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 159, 159–61 (2007) (comparing 
joint criminal enterprise and command-responsibility liability in international criminal law 
prosecutions); Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility Under the Doctrine 
of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 109, 110 (2007) (noting the difficulties in 
identifying specific contributions of each party to a crime); Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3299483 
114 Texas Law Review [Vol. XX: ppp 
incorporated into the law of responsibility.71 This likely reflects the practical 
consideration that the higher the risks of responsibility, the more cautious 
actors will be in accepting obligations. 
Even if actors are willing to accept higher obligations, all international 
dispute settlement mechanisms are premised on state consent, and most do 
not have jurisdiction over other international institutions or corporations.72 
Thus, a responsibility gap will likely be maintained where a harm occurs 
during an epidemic because adjudication of a claim may not be able to 
proceed against the state if it withholds its consent to jurisdiction and, in any 
event, would not include other international actors involved. 
The law of responsibility is the extant framework for determining 
secondary obligations. It is also an imperfect regime for conceptualizing and 
allocating responsibility for combating epidemics because to address many 
of the most pressing problems, states acting alone will be powerless to make 
any significant difference.73 The state-centric nature of the law of 
responsibility leaves important nonstate actors outside the circle. The law of 
responsibility, like other areas of law, is not neutral, as even the non-
attribution of responsibility is a method of distributing responsibility. It 
reflects choices and practices of states. The sections below examine the 
conventional law of responsibility and illustrate its limitations as applied to 
addressing highly-infectious diseases. 
 1.  Cholera & Allocating Responsibility.—“Cholera is an acute 
diarrhoeal infection caused by ingestion of food or water contaminated with” 
the Cholera bacteria.74 Most infected people display only mild symptoms and 
recover with minimal treatment.75 However, in some infected individuals the 
disease can lead to severe dehydration and death if treatment is not promptly 
administered.76 The WHO estimates that every year there are approximately 
1.3 to 4 million cases of Cholera and an estimated 21,000 to 143,000 deaths 
worldwide.77 
In October 2010, Cholera tragically reemerged in Haiti for the first time 
after a century. Following the outbreak, the U.N.’s Panel of Independent 
 
Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 69, 70 (2007) 
(analyzing the doctrine); Herman G. van der Wilt, The Continuous Quest for Proper Modes of 
Criminal Responsibility, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 307, 307–08 (2009) (identifying the challenges in 
choosing the correct mode of criminal responsibility). 
71. See Nollkaemper, supra note 66, at 290 (noting that principles of joint liability from tort 
and criminal law have not been incorporated into international law). 
72. Id. at 295. 
73. See id. at 283 (noting that when it comes to responding to the world’s most pressing 
problems, such as environmental cooperation or mass killings, individual states will often be 
incapable of making much of a difference). 
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Experts found that its peacekeepers and its failure to establish proper 
sanitation systems in its camps were not the but-for causes of the epidemic. 
Instead, the organization blamed “water and sanitation and health care system 
deficiencies . . . coupled with conducive environmental and epidemiological 
conditions” for allowing Cholera to spread.78 The U.N. blaming conditions 
in Haiti—which has prompted it to repeatedly intervene in the country for the 
spread of the epidemic—is illuminating. This is especially so when one 
considers that reconstruction efforts following the earthquake neglected the 
importance of reviving and building robust institutions aimed at the 
detection, prevention, and control of communicable diseases. 
Scholars have criticized the U.N.’s response for being both a public 
relations and public health disaster.79 A U.S.-based NGO working with 
lawyers in Haiti sent a petition to the U.N. Secretary General with 5,000 
signatures presenting a number of legal arguments.80 After over a year, the 
U.N. responded by dismissing those arguments as “not receivable” given the 
organization’s immunity under the General Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations.81 Three separate class action lawsuits were 
also brought in New York against the U.N.82 Its response in the face of these 
claims is heartbreaking but unsurprising.83 On September 26, 2018, Haitian 
human rights lawyers requested an emergency injunction before the Tribunal 
de Première Instance de Port-au-Prince against the State of Haiti, which 
would compel it to trigger the creation of a standing claims commission.84 If 
created, the commission could potentially address claims arising from the 
 
78. CRAVIOTO ET AL., supra note 15, at 4. 
79. See, e.g., Jose Alvarez, The United Nations in the Time of Cholera, 108 AJIL UNBOUND 
22, 22 (2014) (“The United Nations’ handling of the allegations that its peacekeepers in Haiti are 
responsible for the largest number of Cholera cases and deaths in the world is a public relations as 
well as public health disaster.”). 
80. Petition for Relief from Mario Joseph, Brian Concannon, Jr. & Ira Kurzban, Attorneys for 
Petitioners, to Chief, Claims Unit, MINUSTAH 18, 36 (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/englishpetitionREDACTED.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4EU4-E9JD]. 
81. Letter from Patricia O’Brien, Under Sec’y-Gen. for Legal Aff., United Nations, to Brian 
Concannon, Jr., Dir., Inst. for Justice & Democracy in Haiti (July 5, 2013), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/20130705164515.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQM6-XYM6]. 
82. Class Action Complaint, Laventure v. United Nations, 279 F. Supp. 3d 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(No. 14-CV-1611), appeal docketed, No. 17-2908 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 2017); Class Action Complaint, 
Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 13-CV-7146), aff’d, 834 F.3d 
88 (2d Cir. 2016); Complaint, Jean-Robert v. United Nations, No. 14-CV-1545 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 
2014) (dismissed Jan. 26, 2015). 
83. Alvarez, supra note 79, at 24 (noting that national courts in the United States and elsewhere 
always recognize the U.N.’s comprehensive immunity). 
84. Press Release, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, Le Dossier des Victimes du 
Choléra en Attente D’ordonnance du Juge des Référés, https://www.ijdh.org/2018/10/projects/le-
dossier-des-victimes-du-cholera-en-attente-dordonnance-du-juge-des-referes/ 
[https://perma.cc/RXD5-BPS3]. 
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Cholera epidemic in Haiti. A standing claims commission is envisioned as 
the primary means for the settlement of disputes based on the Status of Forces 
Agreement in effect between the United Nations and Haiti.85 
To date, the U.N. has continued to skirt responsibility86 and has not 
compensated those harmed for its role in enabling the spread of Cholera in 
Haiti. A potential remedy to this responsibility gap is the International Law 
Commission’s proposal to make states responsible in certain situations where 
they delegate authority to an international organization, which then violates 
rights.87 The proposal would hold states responsible even where the injury 
was solely attributable to the international institution.88 The International 
Law Commission has also proposed that an institution can be responsible in 
connection with the wrongful acts of states where, for example, the 
organization adopts a decision that requires states to commit acts that 
contravene international obligations.89 
Notably, the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations recognizes that in situations of internationally wrongful acts 
where there is concerted action between international organizations and 
states, both the states and the organizations have shared responsibility.90 The 
Draft Articles also provide for shared responsibility between international 
organizations.91 While the Draft Articles potentially improve upon the status 
quo, they still fail to account for cumulative action. They also do not clarify 
how responsibilities are to be allocated amongst multiple actors.92 For 
example, international institutions increasingly also have public–private 
partnerships and rely on private actors, especially in the field of global public 
 
85. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Haiti Concerning the Status 
of the United Nations Operation in Haiti, U.N.-Haiti, art. 55, July 9, 2004, 2271 U.N.T.S. 235. 
86. Devika Hovell, Due Process in the United Nations, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 30–31 (2016). 
87. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/64/10, at 
162–76 (2009) [hereinafter Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-First Session] (proposing that states 
shoulder the responsibility for the wrongful acts of international organizations). 
88. Id. at 162–63. 
89. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, at 107–09 (2011) [hereinafter 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations]. 
90. See id. at 111 (“This chapter is without prejudice to the international responsibility of the 
State or international organization which commits the act in question, or of any other State or 
international organization.”). 
91. See id. at 144–45 (“Where an international organization and one or more States or other 
international organizations are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the 
responsibility of each State or organization may be invoked in relation to that act.”). 
92. For further discussion, see Nollkaemper & Jacobs, supra note 64, at 396–97 (“It would 
seem that if joint responsibility is to be a useful concept in international law, it should likewise be 
defined in terms of what injured parties, or international institutions, can demand of each of the 
responsible states.”). 
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health.93 It is unclear how responsibility is to be apportioned in instances of 
violations of the right to health with public–private partnerships. 
Furthermore, the Draft Articles do not yet have the status of law. Even if they 
are interpreted as binding, most international organizations and private 
actors, like corporations, may not necessarily be bound by international law 
obligations or even soft law in many areas, and if they are, their obligations 
may not be the same as those of states. 
Relatedly, the regime governing jurisdiction over international 
institutions is meek—they are immune from suit domestically, and typically, 
no court has jurisdiction. International organizations like the U.N. have been 
found to have legal personality,94 which enables them to make claims and to 
have claims made against them. Under the current regime, international 
organizations are legally responsible only for the wrongs they choose to be 
responsible for.95 Thus, notwithstanding the clear, causal relationship 
between the action of an identifiable actor that is one of its agents, the U.N. 
has refused to accept its legal, moral, and political responsibility for the 
resulting harm of the Cholera epidemic in Haiti.96 Responsibility should not 
turn on whether an organization assents to jurisdiction or not.97 
Indeed, numerous actors can be considered responsible for the release 
of the deadly Cholera epidemic in Haiti. First, the Nepalese military deployed 
personnel to Haiti using a problematic medical screening process, which 
failed to detect or prevent Cholera in the deployed troops and can be 
considered directly causally responsible for the transmission of Cholera into 
the population.98 Additionally, the U.N. had inadequate sanitary facilities for 
treatment of waste at the camp and insufficient monitoring of its bases and 
contractors.99 As such, the U.N. was either vicariously liable through its 
 
93. See generally, e.g., Kent Buse & Andrew M. Harmer, Seven Habits of Highly Effective 
Global Public-Private Health Partnerships: Practice and Potential, 64 SOC. SCI. & MED. 259 
(2006) (discussing the effects of public–private partnerships on global public health). 
94. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174, 185 (Apr. 11) (holding that the U.N. possesses an “objective international 
personality” with capacity to bring international claims). 
95. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 141 (discussing how international institutions have 
internal procedures to process grievances from employees and third parties). 
96. See, e.g., Alston, supra note 14, at 1 (explaining that the U.N. authorities “contested the 
proposition that the peacekeepers had been responsible” for Cholera’s appearance in Haiti). 
97. See Hovell, supra note 86, at 37 (arguing that the U.N. “must look beyond legal boundaries” 
when determining the scope of its responsibilities); see also Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Shared Political 
Responsibility (locating political responsibility in specific agents and actions for the construction of 
new arrangements), in DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 
17, at 62, 65. 
98. See CRAVIOTO ET AL., supra note 15, at 8, 12–13 (describing U.N. troop practices to support 
the hypothesis that the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti’s camp was the direct source for the 
Cholera outbreak). 
99. Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 149. 
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mission’s failure or more indirectly causally responsible for the Cholera 
epidemic by failing to provide adequate guidelines.100 Also, a Haitian 
contractor disposed of waste improperly near the base and at the river101 and 
is causally responsible for the resulting Cholera epidemic. In addition, the 
Haitian government did not have proper procedures in place to trigger an 
early warning system and, more generally, failed to provide a secure and safe 
system for providing drinking water.102 As a result, the Haitian government 
is also causally responsible for the Cholera epidemic. 
How is responsibility allocated amongst these various actors?103 The 
most common answer is that no actor is held responsible.104 An alternative 
would be to have only the state actors be jointly and severally responsible for 
the resulting harm irrespective of their own contributions. However, the law 
of responsibility does not allow for this possibility. Another is that one state 
actor is held responsible for the harm irrespective of the size of the individual 
contribution of the Haitian or Nepalese governments. Conduct is attributable 
to the Nepalese state under the law of responsibility because it was committed 
by an organ or agent of the government, as the military personnel were on 
the base. Alternatively, the Haitian government is responsible because it 
failed to exercise due diligence and take necessary measures to prevent harm. 
The analysis above illustrates the state-centric nature of allocating 
responsibility under the conventional paradigm. 
The current proposals for international organizational responsibility 
contemplate making states responsible where they delegate authority to an 
international organization that then violates rights.105 For one or more states 
to assume vicarious responsibility, when some actors were acting through 
international organizations, hardly seems satisfactory here. Penalizing states 
for delegations of authority to international organizations that result in 
international law violations does not sufficiently account for the independent 
actions of international institutions. Another proposal for responsibility of 
international organizations concerns situations of internationally wrongful 
acts where there is concerted action between international organizations or 
between international organizations and states.106 This proposal also fails to 
 
100. Id. 
101. See CRAVIOTO ET AL., supra note 15, at 22–23; see also JONATHAN M. KATZ, THE BIG 
TRUCK THAT WENT BY: HOW THE WORLD CAME TO SAVE HAITI AND LEFT BEHIND A DISASTER 
228–31 (2013) (reporting that residents saw contractors engaging in unauthorized feces dumping). 
102. Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 149. 
103. See Anne van Aaken, Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Political Economy 
Analysis (noting that it is unclear how responsibility is apportioned among states for international 
wrongful acts), in DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 
153, 156. 
104. See discussion supra subpart II(B) (discussing responsibility gaps in international law). 
105. Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-First Session, supra note 87, at 163–66. 
106. Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 89, at 111, 
144–45. 
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capture the actions of the U.N. in Haiti. There is no evidence of a prior plan 
or agreement between the actors to introduce Cholera into Haiti. The failure 
to provide for cumulative but nonconcerted action by multiple actors 
potentially allows states, and especially nonstate actors, to engage in blame 
avoidance and blame shifting for harmful consequences of highly-infectious 
diseases and to shield themselves from responsibility.107  
The Cholera epidemic in Haiti illustrates why the allocation of 
responsibility is critical for successful implementation of the right to health 
and for bridging the gap between law, policy, and reality. The traditional 
doctrine relies on a narrow conceptualization of causation and would lead to 
inappropriately discounting the role of actors that have contributed indirectly 
to the epidemic in Haiti. Under traditional principles, responsibility cannot 
be determined for some, and other actors would be judgment proof.108 It is 
also not possible to bring an effective claim against the collective.  
Due to the challenges discussed above, where massive violations 
result—like the avoidable deaths during the Cholera epidemic—injured 
parties will be without redress. The state-centric nature of the law of 
responsibility means that the legal requirements are not met for some actors 
implicated in the Cholera epidemic. One of the underlying principles of 
attributing responsibility is that every legal injury deserves a remedy to 
ensure justice to victims. The Cholera epidemic in Haiti indicates that much 
more needs to be done to reform how international actors are held responsible 
for highly-infectious diseases. The traditional framework of responsibility is 
inadequate because it only apportions blame to culpable actors narrowly 
defined and ignores broader conceptualizations of culpability. Also, if it is 
not possible to hold culpable actors responsible in clear cases of but-for and 
proximate causation for any resulting violations of public health, as occurred 
with the Cholera epidemic in Haiti, what happens when the lines of causation 
are even more fraught, as with the Ebola epidemic in West Africa? 
  
 2.  Ebola & Allocating Responsibility.—Ebola is an infectious disease 
that manifests as a severe hemorrhagic fever, which is often fatal without 
proper clinical care, such as providing fluids and maintaining blood pressure 
and oxygen levels.109 Because the early symptoms resemble common 
 
107. Nollkaemper, supra note 66, at 298 (describing blame strategies that actors use to “diffuse 
responsibility” and protect themselves from claims). 
108. Both the Nepalese government and the Haitian government have limited available 
resources to compensate those victimized while not suffering significant reductions in the provision 
of socioeconomic rights to people within its territory, making them de facto judgment proof. See, 
e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 151 n.71 (discussing the limited resources of the Nepalese and 
Haitian governments). 
109. Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 12, 2018), http://www.who.int/news-
room/fact-sheets/detail/ebola-virus-disease [https://perma.cc/T9FF-WZY9] (noting that Ebola is 
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diseases like malaria, many do not realize they are infected and do not seek 
treatment at a hospital.110 The virus is spread in humans through direct 
contact with broken skin, blood, bodily fluids, or contaminated objects, and 
possibly through sexual contact.111 The full toll of the epidemic in West 
Africa is still being uncovered, with reports showing that Ebola can linger in 
survivors’ eyes, causing painful disease, cataracts, and potential blindness in 
the young and old.112 Ebola first appeared in 1976 in separate outbreaks in 
South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.113 Whatever the 
biological or ecological origin of the virus in West Africa, it was the 
sociopolitical and legal landscape that influenced whether the virus would 
lead to a couple of isolated cases or become a full-scale outbreak.114 This 
subsection seeks to foreground the indirect factors—the human-made laws, 
policies, actions, and omissions that gave rise to the Ebola epidemic. It does 
so to expose the fallacy of infectious diseases as purely biological or naturally 
occurring events115 by focusing on one of the many factors that contributed 
to the spread of the epidemic.116 This subsection illuminates the role of 
“structural adjustment” reforms in undermining already compromised health 
systems in the subregion.117 
Structural adjustment refers to the loan conditionalities imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Structural 
adjustment aims to contract certain areas of the formal sector with an eye 
towards improving specific macroeconomic indicators.118 The structural 
 
often fatal if untreated and that rehydration and treatment of specific symptoms improves survival 
rates). 
110. Id.; see also Annie Wilkinson & Melissa Leach, Briefing: Ebola—Myths, Realities, and 
Structural Violence, 114 AFRICAN AFF. 136, 145 (2015) (noting that many people infected with 
Ebola have found themselves “fearful or unable to access hospitals”). 
111. Ctrs. for Disease Control, Ebola Virus Disease Transmission (May 22, 2018), 
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y8GR-E8VS]. 
112. Denise Grady, Ebola’s Legacy: Children with Cataracts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/health/ebola-survivors-cataracts.html 
[https://perma.cc/CJ48-NLF3]. 
113. Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 109. 
114. See Bausch & Schwarz, supra note 20, at 3–4 (“Biological and ecological factors may 
drive emergence of the virus from the forest, but clearly the sociopolitical landscape dictates where 
it goes from there—an isolated case or two or a large and sustained outbreak.”). 
115. See Susan Marks, Human Rights and the Bottom Billion, 2009 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
37, 47 (“[N]atural disasters are never purely natural, and social misfortunes are never purely 
misfortunes.”). 
116. For further discussion, see Sirleaf, supra note 22, at 481 (“[T]he international legal 
architecture facilitates the conditions for global health inequities, and in particular for infectious 
diseases to reach epidemic levels in the Global South.”). 
117. See Brook Baker, The Impact of the International Monetary Fund’s Macroeconomic 
Policies on the AIDS Pandemic, 40 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES. 347, 348–49 (2010) (arguing that 
structural adjustments are one of several IMF policies that have “intensified the global health crisis 
in general and the AIDS pandemic in particular”). 
118. See William Easterly, IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty 
(noting that structural adjustment packages usually require some formal-sector activities to contract 
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adjustment of an economy occurs through compliance with the conditions 
embedded within the terms of loans, like reducing budget deficits, devaluing 
currency, reducing domestic credit expansion, freeing controlled prices and 
interest rates, reducing trade barriers, and privatizing state enterprises.119 
These well-known austerity measures aim to cut budget deficits and improve 
the balance of payments, which often entails budget ceilings and wage 
caps.120 The IMF has been active in West Africa for decades with its 
structural adjustment programs. For example, its first loan in Liberia began 
in 1963,121 and since 1984, the IMF has given consistent support to Sierra 
Leone and Guinea.122 The IMF’s structural adjustment programs prioritized 
short-term macroeconomic objectives over longer term investments in public 
health, and the result predictably hollowed out the flailing health sector.123 
For example, an independent evaluation of the IMF’s structural adjustment 
programs surveyed twenty-nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa between 
1999 and 2005 and found that 37% of all annual aid increases were diverted 
to beefing up currency reserves, with another 37% going to repay debts in 
line with the dictates of structural adjustment—leaving only 27% for health 
and other pressing developmental needs.124 
Irrespective of the labeling that the IMF used to describe its programs—
from structural adjustment, to good governance, to poverty reduction—the 
 
and thus adjust a few highly visible macroeconomic indicators), in MANAGING CURRENCY CRISES 
IN EMERGING MARKETS 361, 363 (Michael P. Dooley & Jeffrey A. Frankel eds., 2003). 
119. Id. at 364. 
120. Baker, supra note 117, at 350. 
121. Liberia: History of Lending Arrangements as of November 30, 2013, IMF (July 29, 2017), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?memberKey1=600&date1key=2013-11-30 
[https://perma.cc/B57N-FVWX]. 
122. See Guinea: Transactions with the Fund from May 01, 1984 to August 31, 2017, IMF 
(July 29, 2017), http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extrans1.aspx?memberKey1=380&endDat 
e=2017-08-31 [https://perma.cc/K87S-VXT6]; Sierra Leone: Transactions with the Fund from 
May 01, 1984 to August 31, 2017, IMF (July 29, 2017), http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad 
/extrans1.aspx?memberKey1=850&endDate=2017-08-31 [https://perma.cc/9M2C-X6FH]. 
123. See David Stuckler & Sanjay Basu, The International Monetary Fund’s Effects on Global 
Health: Before and After the 2008 Financial Crisis, 39 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 771, 773 (2009) 
(addressing the adverse financial effects that IMF loan policies had on the development of the health 
sector within developing countries); see also CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV., DOES THE IMF CONSTRAIN 
HEALTH SPENDING IN POOR COUNTRIES? EVIDENCE AND AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 15 (2007), 
http:///www.cgdev.org/doc/IMF/IMF_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/78UZ-L554] (noting the 
criticism directed at the IMF’s macroeconomic programs for “unduly constrain[ing] a scaling-up of 
health expenditures to respond to the population’s health needs”). 
124. See INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE IMF AND AID TO SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 42 (2007) [hereinafter THE IMF AND AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA], 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2007/ssa/eng/pdf/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5JN-NUQP] 
(displaying the average percentages of aid increases used for different categories of spending in sub-
Saharan Africa between 1999 and 2005). 
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underlying logic and macroeconomic policies remained the same.125 
Although the IMF has attempted to respond to the criticism leveled against 
it, it continues to prioritize “macroeconomic stability” above all else.126 
Indeed, prior to the Ebola outbreak, although all three countries had 
successfully met the IMF’s macroeconomic policy prescriptions, they all 
failed to meet targets for social spending, including health.127 This would 
render the health systems in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea ill-equipped 
to arrest the spread of Ebola when the outbreak began in 2014. 
Moreover, to keep government spending low, the IMF placed 
limitations on public-sector wages, which meant money to employ and 
remunerate doctors, nurses, and other health care professionals was 
limited.128 As health care employment opportunities lessened, health care 
quality and a capable health care workforce concomitantly decreased.129 
Additionally, depressed wages in the public health system contributed to the 
brain-drain problem in the health sector (where indigenous talent leaves for 
greener, more prosperous pastures).130 For instance, even before the Ebola 
epidemic began in 2014, in a survey of health care workers for every 1,000 
persons found, Guinea could only count 0.097 doctors, Liberia, 0.023, and 
Sierra Leone, 0.024.131 In Sierra Leone, the structural adjustment policies of 
the IMF between 1995 and 1996 required the reduction of public 
 
125. See Daniel W. Muriu, The Imperial–Emancipatory Paradox of International Human 
Rights: How Useful Is the Right to Health in Sub-Saharan Africa?, 9 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 
387, 401 (2007) (noting several key policies of international economic institutions in sub-Saharan 
Africa). 
126. Baker, supra note 117, at 356 (concluding that the IMF continues to prioritize 
macroeconomic stability above other concerns despite criticism). 
127. See generally IMF, Guinea: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial 
Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding (Feb. 2014) (detailing the structural 
reforms needed to meet the year’s spending goals); IMF, Liberia: Third Review Under the Extended 
Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criterion 
and Modification of Performance Criteria, Country Report No. 14/197 (July 2014) (same); IMF, 
Sierra Leone: First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request for 
Modification of Performance Criteria, and Financing Assurances Review, Country Report No. 
14/171 (June 2014) (same). 
128. See THE IMF AND AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, supra note 124, at 15 (discussing 
critics’ view that the IMF’s policies are undermining these countries’ social sectors). 
129. Id. 
130. See Karen McColl, Fighting the Brain Drain, 337 BRIT. MED. J. 958, 958 (2008) (noting 
the factors causing the brain-drain problem for health-care workers in Sub-Saharan Africa); David 
McCoy et al., Salaries and Incomes of Health Workers in Sub-Saharan Africa, 371 THE LANCET 
675, 680 (2008) (noting that IMF limits on wage bills prevent healthcare needs from being met); 
ERIC FRIEDMAN, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AN ACTION PLAN TO PREVENT BRAIN DRAIN: 
BUILDING EQUITABLE HEALTH SYSTEMS IN AFRICA 1 (2004), 
http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00010242:21e6b22646882263f8b7aa73a
71c810c.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP8Y-T64Z] (discussing brain drain for health-care workers in sub-
Saharan African countries and its causes). 
131. Global Health Observatory Data Repository: Density per 1,000, by Country, WHO 
(Feb. 2, 2017), http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.92100 [https://perma.cc/F8G7-HTMT] 
(noting data for Guinea in 2005, Liberia in 2008, and Sierra Leone in 2010). 
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employment, which resulted in the retrenchment of 28% of governmental 
employees, with limits on wages continuing into the 2000s.132 This directly 
affected health, as a study provided by the WHO shows a reduction in 
community health workers from 0.11 per 1,000 population in 2004 to 0.02 in 
2008.133 While it is impossible to isolate how much of the lack of health 
workers was caused by structural adjustment, it seems plausible that these 
reform policies were at least a substantial factor in producing this result.134 
Accordingly, the effect of structural adjustment reforms—by insisting on cuts 
in health spending to manage public expenditures—was detrimental to the 
supply of health services. Thus, when the outbreak occurred in 2014, not 
enough trained health workers were readily available to help combat the 
spread of Ebola. 
Additionally, structural adjustment reforms also had a negative impact 
on the demand for health services by reducing household income, leaving 
people with less money for health. Due to the IMF’s structural adjustment 
policies, public health was transformed into a “commodity and an individual 
responsibility.”135 For example, in Sierra Leone, despite the government’s 
introduction of a free health care initiative, health care providers continued 
to charge fees for services, thereby limiting access.136 It was likely influenced 
by the IMF’s admonition to “carefully assess the fiscal implications” of 
providing free health care services.137 Indeed, studies have shown that the 
IMF’s policies have slowed down improvements in, or worsened, the health 
status of people in countries implementing them.138 Given this, it is not 
 
132. Alexander Kentikelenis et al., The International Monetary Fund and the Ebola Outbreak, 
3 LANCET GLOBAL HEALTH e69, e69 (2015). For more information on the IMF’s review of Sierra 
Leone, see generally IMF, Sierra Leone: 2006 Article IV Consultation, First Review Under the 
Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, Financing Assurances 
Review, and Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criterion (Feb. 2007); IMF, 
Sierra Leone: Midterm Review Under the Second Annual Arrangement Under the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criteria (Sept. 1996). 
133. Kentikelenis et al., supra note 132, at e69. 
134. See McColl, supra note 130, at 958 (“Government spending on health workers’ pay has 
been constrained by macroeconomic factors, such as the recruitment freezes and limits on the public 
sector wage bill that were often part of structural adjustment programmes imposed as a condition of 
loans from the World Bank.”). 
135. Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 110, at 142. 
136. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, AT A CROSSROADS: SIERRA LEON’S FREE HEALTH CARE 
POLICY (2011) (describing how Sierra Leone’s health system still charged for services despite a 
free health care initiative). 
137. IMF, Sierra Leone: Sixth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Extended Credit 
Facility, Request for Waiver for Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion, Request for a Three-
Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Financing Assurances Review, Country 
Report No. 10/176, at 10 (May 2010). 
138. See David Stuckler et al., International Monetary Fund Programs and Tuberculosis 
Outcomes in Post-Communist Countries, 5 PLOS MED. 1079, 1086 (2008) (showing the connection 
between IMF programs and the worsening of tuberculosis mortality rates). But see IMF Survey: 
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difficult to see how the depletion of investment in health services contributed 
towards higher incidences of Ebola in the subregion. In the 2000s in Guinea, 
the IMF promoted fiscal and administrative decentralization, which made it 
difficult to plan a coordinated response to Ebola. Five years after Guinea 
complied with IMF dictates to transfer budgetary responsibilities from the 
central government to the local level,139 an IMF mission to the country found 
governance problems, ineffective decentralization, and deterioration of the 
quality of health-service delivery.140 While the IMF programs cannot be 
blamed entirely for this result, it nonetheless indicates that the collective 
effects of the structural adjustment programs potentially made survival from 
an epidemic in the impacted countries less likely. IMF programs made it 
more likely that individuals would rely on communities of care as opposed 
to public health systems, which in turn impeded the ability to have a 
coordinated approach to Ebola. 
The IMF belatedly recognized the connection between its policies and 
the outbreak. IMF Director Christine Lagarde said at a meeting on Ebola in 
2014, “It is good to increase the fiscal deficit when it’s a matter of curing the 
people, of taking the precautions to actually try to contain the disease. The 
IMF doesn’t say that very often.”141 Indeed, the IMF had been requiring the 
exact opposite for decades preceding.  
The IMF’s structural adjustment programs are illustrative of how action 
by international institutions can facilitate epidemics and how the temporal 
distance between the initial action and the resulting outbreak can lead to the 
disremembering of structural factors. For example, the Ebola epidemic in 
West Africa was the result of historical vulnerability from slavery, 
colonialism, neocolonialism, bad governance, and neoliberal reform policies 
like structural adjustment, amongst others. When institutions like the IMF 
contribute to indivisible harms as witnessed with Ebola, the dominant 
paradigm of responsibility is unable to provide redress and fails to capture 
these violations.  
 
IMF Casts Doubt on TB Study, IMF (July 23, 2008), https://www.imf.org/en/News 
/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sores072308a [https://perma.cc/LJT8-WWBF] (criticizing the study). 
139. See IMF, Guinea: Staff Report for the 2002 Article IV Consultation, the First Review 
Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, Requests for Waiver of Performance Criteria, 
Second-Year Program Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, and for Additional 
Interim Assistance Under the Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, at 49–69 
(July 2002) (detailing the results of Guinea’s first review); IMF, Guinea: Staff Report for the 
Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, at  
46–65 (Apr. 2001) (noting compliance). 
140. IMF, Guinea: Staff Report for the 2007 Article IV Consultation and Requests for Three-
Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and for Additional Interim 
Assistance Under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, at 5–7 (Dec. 2007). 
141. Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Remarks on the Impact of the 
Ebola Crisis: A Perspective from the Countries (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.worldbank.org 
/en/news/speech/2014/10/09/transcript-event-impact-ebola-crisis-perspective-countries 
[https://perma.cc/MD7E-GDCE]. 
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The conventional law of responsibility depends on a clearly identifiable 
actor who acts to produce injury.142 However, the traditional approach 
typically fails to capture the harms caused by highly-infectious diseases due 
to the multiplicity of actors causally contributing directly and indirectly to 
the harm. Thus, the increased rates of morbidity and illness from infectious 
diseases like Ebola are unaccounted for. This makes it incredibly “difficult 
to secure effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress”143 
for epidemics using the traditional framework of responsibility. 
The law of responsibility is inept. It privileges the status quo and directs 
attention towards individual claims against specific actors for identifiable 
proximate harms and away from broader conceptualizations and concepts of 
shared responsibility.144 It is inadequate for combating highly-infectious 
diseases because it focuses on state actors often to the exclusion of 
international organizations and other important nonstate actors. The analysis 
above indicates that a reexamination of the current doctrine of responsibility 
is needed more generally and especially as applied to combating  
highly-infectious diseases.  
C. Reconceptualizing Responsibility: Wither the Responsibility to Protect 
A rival principle that challenges the traditional view of state 
responsibility is the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect. This 
section examines what the norm entails and demonstrates why R2P offers an 
incomplete vision for reconceptualizing responsibility. The foundational 
principles of R2P provide that the state has the primary responsibility for 
protecting its people, but if a state is unwilling or unable to stop or prevent 
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, the principle of 
nonintervention in the internal affairs of states is to yield to the international 
 
142. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 60 (“The justification for 
attributing to the State . . . the conduct of ‘parastatal’ entities lies in the fact that the internal law of 
the State has conferred on the entity in question the exercise of certain elements of governmental 
authority.”). 
143. ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR 9 (2011). 
144. See generally Nollkaemper & Jacobs, supra note 64 (discussing the reluctance of states to 
accept responsibility for acts other than their own). 
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responsibility to protect.145 R2P is not settled law, and the extent to which it 
influences state behavior is sporadic at best.146 
The U.N. Secretary General has indicated that there are three 
components of implementing R2P. Pillar I emphasizes that states have the 
primary responsibility to protect their own populations and suggests ways 
states can improve their capacity to do so.147 Pillar II focuses on the 
responsibility of the international community to assist states in building 
capacity to protect their populations through development assistance, 
preventative deployments, rule-of-law aid, and similar peaceful measures.148 
Lastly, Pillar III stresses the responsibility of the international community to 
take timely and decisive action to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity when a state is manifestly failing to 
protect its population.149 Pillar III has effectively overshadowed Pillar II in 
practice. It also seems useless to extricate Pillar II from the rest of the doctrine 
because, if the objective is to assist states in building capacity, this could be 
achieved without the rest of R2P’s baggage. 
Most of the debate on R2P centers less on what satisfies the duty to 
cooperate150 and more on fears of its misapplication. The International Law 
 
145. U.N. Secretary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility to Protect]; see, e.g., 
Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h), July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that the 
African Union has the right “to intervene in a Member State” regarding “grave circumstances,” 
including “war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity”); G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138 (Sept. 16, 
2005) (“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of 
such crimes . . . . We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.”); S.C. Res. 1674, 
¶ 4 (Apr. 28, 2006) (reaffirming the “responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crime . . . and crimes against humanity”); ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE 
GLOBAL EFFORT TO END MASS ATROCITIES 67 (2009) (noting that the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome “provide[s] a mandate for a wide range of institutional reforms and international activities 
aimed at protecting people from . . . mass atrocities”). 
146. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 60, at 114 (acknowledging that it is 
ambiguous “whether general international law at present prescribes a positive duty of cooperation” 
to end serious breaches of preemptory norms presented by R2P situations and that its statements to 
the contrary are aspirational and geared towards the “progressive development of international 
law”); id. at 112–13 (including a nonexhaustive list of examples of peremptory norms, such as the 
prohibition against genocide, war crimes, aggression, torture, and slavery, amongst others); see also 
GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND 
FOR ALL 55 (2008) (noting the continued resistance to the concept); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility 
to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 108–09 (2007) 
(outlining the moral and political concepts of R2P and its derivative responsibilities to prevent, 
react, and rebuild). 
147. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 145, ¶ 11. 
148. Id.; see also Lloyd Axworthy & Allan Rock, R2P: A New and Unfinished Agenda, 1 
GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 54, 59 (2009) (describing the R2P toolbox of peaceful interventions). 
149. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 145, ¶ 11; see also Axworthy & 
Rock, supra note 148, at 60. 
150. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility provide that 
all states shall cooperate to bring an end through lawful means to serious breaches of peremptory 
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Commission states that cooperation in R2P situations can take place through 
international organizations or be noninstitutionalized.151 The institutionalized 
form of R2P is most often affiliated with the United Nations Security Council 
(Council)152 or regional organizations. The role of the Council in 
implementing R2P153 must be approached with trepidation as it could 
improperly exceed its mandate and potentially violate respect for state 
sovereignty. The noninstitutionalized form of R2P is also potentially subject 
to misuse by powerful states, since they can use R2P as a pretext for military 
intervention and to sustain global hierarchies.154 Because R2P assigns duties 
to all outside states with little differentiation, it faces some of the same 
challenges with undistributed duties not being discharged that the law of 
responsibility does. 
In sum, R2P offers an insufficient shift in reconceptualizing 
responsibility. As one of the most radical challenges to traditional principles 
of responsibility, it still falls into predictable hierarchies that privilege civil 
and political rights over and above economic and social rights. R2P is a 
modest improvement on the completely state-centric nature of the law of 
 
norms. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 60, at 112–16. Peremptory norms of 
general international law are norms that are “accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
151. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 60, at 112 (citing the Vienna 
Convention’s description of the peremptory norm in explicating the concept). 
152. See R2P REPORT, supra note 25, at 52 (emphasizing that decisions on intervention should 
be made by the Council); see also Rep. of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
transmitted by Letter Dated 1 December 2004 from the Chair of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change Addressed to the Secretary-General, ¶ 206, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 
2004) (echoing the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 
recommendations and calling on the Council to adopt and agree on a set of guidelines to maximize 
the possibility of consensus on when it is appropriate to use coercive action). 
153. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 
21st Century, ¶ 219, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000) (stating the Council’s moral duty to act 
on behalf of the international community); R2P REPORT, supra note 25, ¶ 52 (explaining the 
importance of the Council’s responsibility); Louise Arbour, The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty 
of Care in International Law and Practice, 34 REV. INT’L STUD. 445, 453 (2008) (positing that the 
Council holds a heavier responsibility than other states to ensure the protection of all civilians). 
154. See, e.g., Alex J. Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian 
Intervention and the 2005 World Summit, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 143, 161 (2006) (“[T]he 
responsibility to protect [should] not be used as a pretext to undermine the sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity of states.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stahn, supra 
note 146, at 102 (noting that one can simply recharacterize the responsibility to protect into a legally 
undesirable right to intervene for humanitarian reasons); Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian 
Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change (“Humanitarian justifications—particularly the 
claim of necessary action in the face of humanitarian catastrophe—have become more central, 
moreover, to how states justify and evaluate military options.”), in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 232, 246–47 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane 
eds., 2003). 
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responsibility because it hints at responsibility beyond the state. However, 
R2P embeds state-centricity in other ways, for example, by pretending as if 
the conditions that give rise to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
genocide in any given state are divorced from international actors. It also fails 
to adequately distribute responsibility and comes with the additional danger 
of exploitation and advancing imperialistic tendencies of powerful states. The 
next subsection demonstrates why R2P is flawed as applied to combating 
highly-infectious diseases. 
  
 The Inappositeness of the Responsibility to Protect for Combating 
Epidemics.—R2P’s original conceptualization was much broader. For 
example, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty argued that it included protection from starvation.155 Some 
scholars argue for a return to first principles, beyond R2P’s historical 
association with crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.156 This 
expanded approach would theoretically allow for R2P to have broader 
significance and address serious socioeconomic violations caused by 
structural processes.157 This author is unconvinced that R2P can be 
rehabilitated or expanded in meaningful ways.158 
First, it does not appear that R2P has any real utility for responding to 
highly-infectious diseases. For example, applying the R2P framework to 
epidemics would mean that each state would be expected to reduce the 
number of highly-infectious diseases within its borders; the international 
community would be expected to assist states towards meeting its goals; and 
where a state or other actors are unable or unwilling to do their part toward 
fulfilling or supporting a state’s duty to protect its population from  
highly-infectious diseases,159 the state and/or other actors could be subject to 
serious consequences. However, states are not self-sufficient, and the 
distribution of highly-infectious diseases is fundamentally conditioned in 
 
155. See R2P REPORT, supra note 25, at VIII (defining the “Responsibility to Protect” as a 
nation’s responsibility to protect its citizens from avoidable catastrophes such as mass murder, rape, 
and starvation). 
156. See generally Lindsey N. Kingston & Saheli Datta, Strengthening the Norms of Global 
Responsibility: Structural Violence in Relation to Internal Displacement and Statelessness, 4 
GLOBAL RESP. PROTECT 475 (2012) (arguing that sovereignty as responsibility demands broader 
protection of human rights by addressing structural problems). 
157. See Axworthy & Rock, supra note 148, at 56–57 (advocating for the expansion of R2P 
principles beyond violence prevention to address systematic human rights violations). 
158. But see E. Tendayi Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, and the Responsibility to Protect 
Refugees, 100 MINN. L. REV. 687, 745 (2015) (arguing that, despite its flaws, R2P provides a 
valuable framework for shared responsibility among international actors); Jay Butler, Responsibility 
for Regime Change, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 510 (2014) (positing that R2P should extend to 
intervenor-states involved in regime change). 
159. For further discussion on the problem of determining unwillingness versus lack of 
capacity, see discussion infra subsection III(B)(2)(b). 
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part by transnational actors and global institutions.160 Accordingly, an 
expanded conceptualization of R2P would still problematically place primary 
responsibility on countries that are the least equipped to combat epidemics 
effectively. 
Thus, for R2P to have any relevance for altering the conditions that led 
to underlying structural issues,161 it must be permanently divorced from the 
blunt coercive measures utilized under it. Given R2P’s primary association 
with the use of force,162 its value in combating epidemics is inherently 
suspect. Indeed, the use of force to arrest epidemics would lead to more 
damaging socioeconomic consequences.163 Allowing for potentially selective 
military enforcement is a precarious method for preventing the spread of 
diseases. And, even with a Council authorization, military intervention would 
still only aggravate direct and structural harms. Changing the underlying 
systems, institutions, laws, and policies that facilitate epidemics would not 
be furthered by allowing for military intervention. 
Additionally, economic sanctions as a means of addressing  
highly-infectious diseases and global health inequities also seem particularly 
unfitting. Economic isolation would only exacerbate the problems of 
countries with epidemics in attempting to marshal resources to provide 
treatment and to prevent further contagion.164 Such measures will prove 
counterproductive and increase tensions at a time when greater international 
cooperation is needed.  
 
160. See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Why Trade Law Needs a Theory of Justice, 100 PROC. AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. 376, 377 (2006) (discussing wealth distributions in the global economy). 
161. See Iris Young, From Guilt to Solidarity: Sweatshops and Political Responsibility, 
DISSENT, Spring 2003, at 39, 39–40, 44, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/from-guilt-to-
solidarity [https://perma.cc/HG2Y-G4CW] (“[M]any structural processes do not recognize national 
boundaries, and they often produce more widespread and long-term harms than do particular actions 
or policies.”). 
162. See R2P REPORT, supra note 25, at 55 (noting that if the Council fails to “discharge its 
responsibility in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, then it is unrealistic to expect 
that concerned states will rule out other means and forms of action to meet the gravity and urgency 
of these situations”); see also G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 145, ¶ 139 (“[W]e are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council . . . and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate . . . .”); Monica Hakimi, 
Distributing the Responsibility to Protect (remarking on the historic association of R2P with the use 
of force), in DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 265, 
271. 
163. See Alison Agnew, A Combative Disease: The Ebola Epidemic in International Law, 39 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 97, 124–25 (2016) (examining the dangers of militarizing disease 
outbreaks and prescribing alternative international disease-control strategies). 
164. See Marcella David, Rubber Helmets: The Certain Pitfalls of Marshaling Security Council 
Resources to Combat AIDS in Africa, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 560, 574 (2001) (emphasizing that economic 
sanctions serve to isolate target states and thereby strain resources available for disease control 
efforts). 
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Problematically, there is no limiting principle within R2P that would 
prevent the Council or other international actors from utilizing one of these 
unsuitable means to implement R2P as opposed to more pacific measures. 
Accordingly, R2P might allow for sovereignty incursions whether states in 
the Global South want or need health assistance and could open the 
floodgates for pretextual interventions.165 
Finally, because the international community has not been able to 
successfully deal with problems of direct mass personal violence in R2P 
situations, it may be even less equipped and willing to address problems 
presented by epidemics. Given the above considerations, R2P is patently 
unsuitable for addressing challenges posed by pandemics. Accordingly, the 
next Part demonstrates why the CBDR framework offers a more compelling 
vision of shared responsibility and why it will more effectively address 




III. Common but Differentiated Responsibility and Epidemics 
A. Understanding Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
  
 1. CBDR in Theory.—CBDR reflects the effort to achieve equity 
between richer countries in the Global North and poorer states in the Global 
South.166 Under it, richer countries agree to take on higher obligations to 
combat environmental concerns to reflect consumption and production 
patterns, as well as the unequal distributions of risks that result in more 
devastating environmental consequences for poorer countries.167 It is based 
 
165. See id. at 571 (warning against the risk that wealthier nations may rely on health 
interventions as a pretense to pursue national interests in less powerful regions). 
166. See generally Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in 
International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 276 (2004) (exploring the increased adoption of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and the circumstances under which differentiation is desirable). 
167. See, e.g., Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 13, 2015 [hereinafter Paris Framework] (“This Agreement will be implemented to 
reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”), in Rep. of the Conference of the 
Parties on the Twenty-First Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, annex (2016); United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-
38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (enumerating the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities by 
which treaty signers are expected to abide); see also United Nations Climate Change, Paris 
Agreement—Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php 
[https://perma.cc/T3E5-9PH9] (noting that 197 signatories and 175 state parties have so far ratified 
the agreement, including China). 
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in part on the principle of solidarity168 and reflects the role of the Global 
South in shaping international law by demanding more equitable rules.169 
The first step in understanding the CBDR framework requires clarity on 
the meaning of “common.” The principle of CBDR in international 
environmental law evolved from resources that were considered part of the 
“common heritage” or of common concern to humans.170 The rhetoric of 
“common interest,” “common concern,” and “common heritage of mankind” 
was originally conceived to deal with deep seabed resources and issues of the 
utilization of outer space.171 The aim of these treaties was to further 
conservation and protection efforts.172 The use of “common” in the CBDR 
framework suggests that certain resources “affect and are affected by every 
nation on earth.”173 
The second part of understanding the CBDR framework necessitates 
precision on the meaning of “differentiated responsibility.” This element of 
CBDR in international environmental law focuses on a range of different 
burden-sharing arrangements that take into account each nation’s particular 
circumstances,174 especially “each State’s contribution to the evolution of a 
 
168. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 1972) (explaining in Principle 24 that states 
are obliged in the spirit of solidarity to cooperate in preventing transboundary pollution). 
169. Paris Framework, supra note 167, arts. 4(1), 4(2) (noting that obligations are subject to 
CBDR). Transitioning economies are also subjected to differential treatment under the Convention. 
Id. art. 4(6). 
170. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity pmbl., June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 
(noting that conserving “biological diversity is a common concern of humankind”); Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the 
Execution of the Convention 1954, pmbl. May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001875/187580e.pdf [https://perma.cc/P749-JMWK] 
(“Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means 
damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the 
culture of the world.”); International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific 
Ocean pmbl., May 9, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 380, 205 U.N.T.S. 65 (categorizing conservation efforts 
towards tuna as serving the common interest of mankind). 
171. See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
the Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies arts. 1, 11, Jan. 27, 1967, 
18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (referring to outer space as the “province of all mankind” and 
noting that the “moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind”). 
172. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage art. 6, Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37 (imposing a duty on the international community to 
protect “world heritage”); Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat pmbl., Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 11,084, 996 U.N.T.S. 245 (characterizing 
waterfowls as an “international resource”). 
173. Stone, supra note 166, at 276. 
174. See, e.g., International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture art. 
7.2(a), Nov. 3, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 17-313, 2400 U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force June 29, 2004) 
(directing international cooperation to establish and strengthen the capabilities of developing 
countries and economies in transition); id. art. 8 (requiring parties to promote the provision of 
technical assistance to developing countries and economies in transition); Convention to Combat 
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particular problem and its ability to prevent, reduce and control the threat.”175 
CBDR focuses on the state’s historical contributions to environmental 
degradation and takes this into account when fashioning legal 
commitments.176 The idea of differentiated responsibilities in environmental 
law was aimed at promoting “substantive equality between developing and 
developed States within a regime, rather than mere formal equality.”177 
 2.  CBDR in Practice.—CBDR reflects the belief that while all states are 
responsible for global environmental problems like ozone depletion, some 
states are more responsible than others.178 In light of this principle, countries 
in the Global North have committed to joint projects in developing countries 
to assist with issues like emissions reductions.179 Developed countries have 
also been asked “to take the lead” in mobilizing finance for tackling 
environmental challenges.180 These initiatives recognize that developing 
countries will need major assistance from developed countries if they are to 
mitigate the detrimental effects of ozone depletion and climate change. 
CBDR in international environmental law is premised on the logic that 
the countries responsible for polluting the global commons should utilize the 
 
Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, 
Particularly in Africa arts. 3, 5–6, June 17, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. No. 104-29, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3 
(calling for the full consideration of the special needs and circumstances of affected developing 
countries, particularly the least among them); Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 170, 
arts. 8(m), 9(e) (mandating all parties to cooperate in the provision of financial and other support to 
developing countries for conservation); id. art. 20 (noting that developed countries must provide 
financial resources to developing countries to enable them to implement the Convention). 
175. CBDR: ORIGINS AND SCOPE, supra note 26; see also Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants pmbl., May 22, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. No. 107-5, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered 
into force May 17, 2004) (noting the respective capabilities of developed and developing countries 
and the CBDR of states); id. art. 4(7) (providing that parties take due account of the special 
circumstances of developing countries as well as transitioning economies in deciding whether to 
grant exceptions); id. art. 12(2) (recognizing that parties are required to provide technical assistance 
to developing and transitioning countries to assist them with their obligations); PHILLIPE SANDS, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 286 (2d ed. 2003) (overlaying the concept 
of CBDR with the 1992 Climate Change Convention). 
176. SANDS, supra note 175, at 218, 287–89. 
177. CBDR: ORIGINS AND SCOPE, supra note 26. 
178. Christopher C. Joyner, Professor of Gov’t., Georgetown University, Remarks on Common 
but Differentiated Responsibility (Mar. 13–16, 2002), in Introduction, 96 PROC. OF THE ANN. 
MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.) 358, 358. 
179. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change art. 12, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (committing 
developed nations to share proceeds of clean-power technology with developing nations). Initially, 
under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries made certain commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, economies in transition had lesser commitments, and developing nations made no 
commitments toward reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. See id. arts. 3(1), (5). 
180. E.g., Paris Framework, supra note 167, art. 9(3); see also Adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015 (clarifying, under the section labeled “Decisions to Give Effect to the 
Agreement,” that developed countries will implement “meaningful mitigation actions”), in Rep. of 
the Conference of the Parties on the Twenty-First Session, ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1. 
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resources gained from those activities and have primary responsibility for 
cleaning up the environment, as well as help other countries adapt clean-
development technologies.181 For example, the most recent climate-change-
mitigation effort, the Paris Agreement, acknowledges the specific needs and 
concerns of developing countries arising from implementation measures.182 
Under the Paris Agreement, each party makes self-determined emissions 
reductions with climate change adaptation plans that are to be in place by 
2020.183 CBDR is still reflected in many aspects of the treaty, from the 
preamble184 to the differentiation between developing and developed 
countries in the Annex, as well as provisions that stress the importance of 
financing and technology transfer for developing nations.185 
The principle of CBDR is also reflected in the ozone protection regime. 
Important developing countries like China and India were initially not 
members of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer.186 They argued that they had not caused the problem and were 
unwilling to forgo using cheaper products with ozone-depleting substances, 
or to use more expensive substitutes to enrich the industry responsible for the 
problem.187 Legal obligations in conventions reflecting CBDR are not just 
based on differentiated mitigation actions for developing and developed 
 
181. See Lindsay Wiley, Moving Global Health Law Upstream: A Critical Appraisal of Global 
Health Law as a Tool for Health Adaptation to Climate Change, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
439, 488 (2010). But see Christopher C. Joyner, Burning International Bridges, Fuelling Global 
Discontent: The United States and Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, 33 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON 
L. REV. 27, 27, 36 (2002) (discussing the reluctance of the United States and other chief emitters 
like China to participate in agreements like the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention). 
182. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties 
on Its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, at 21 (2013); see also The Paris 
Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/09/the-paris-agreement-faqs/ 
[https://perma.cc/EK6U-LM2A] (describing the Paris Agreement “as an important tool in 
mobilizing . . . support and capacity building for developing countries”). 
183. The Paris Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 182. 
184. See, e.g., Paris Framework, supra note 167, pmbl. (calling for cooperation by all countries 
in accordance with their “common but differentiated responsibilities”). 
185. E.g., id. arts. 4, 9–10. 
186. See Status of Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=XXVII-2-a&chapter=27 [https://perma.cc/7NC2-58RB] (noting that China and India 
did not accede to the 1987 treaty until 1991 and 1992, respectively). The Protocol was part of a 
series of overlapping treaty arrangements that make up the ozone regime. The regime was 
formulated to reduce ozone-depleting chemicals, which have many industrial uses. Yet, utilizing 
these substances created a hole in the ozone layer, which allowed more ultraviolet radiation to reach 
the earth’s surface, harming human, animal, and plant health. Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer pmbl., art. 2, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 [hereinafter Montreal 
Protocol]. 
187. JEFFREY DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A 
PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 637 (4th ed. 2015). 
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states.188 For example, the London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol of 
1991 incorporates the principle of CBDR through the creation of a 
Multilateral Fund, which provided for differing contributions to adaptation 
measures for developed and developing states.189 The ozone treaty regime 
reflects the equity arguments made by developing countries and provides 
additional incentives for developing countries to ratify and comply with their 
obligations under the treaty. The ozone regime is one of the biggest success 
stories in international law. Since 2005, the ozone hole has been shrinking.190 
By 2014, the ozone treaties had resulted in the phasing out of 98% of all 
ozone-depleting substances.191 Scientists anticipate that the hole in the ozone 
will close completely by around 2060.192 
The principle of CBDR has met with mixed results in mitigating climate 
change but has been usefully applied to address ozone depletion in practice. 
While the ozone regime has served to mostly eliminate the production and 
use of ozone-depleting substances, the climate-change regime has produced 
only modest steps at stabilizing greenhouse gases. However, climate change 
is a vastly more complex problem than ozone depletion. It involves virtually 
every form of human activity that contributes to greenhouse gases and 
presents more difficult distributional and equity issues than ozone depletion. 
Overall, the analysis above indicates that CBDR has continued vitality. 
B. Expanding the Common but Differentiated Responsibility Framework 
This section develops and expands the theory underlying the framework 
of CBDR. It applies this framework to the Cholera and Ebola epidemics, 
which in turn yields important implications for the theory of CBDR. This 
section fleshes out aspects of the CBDR framework that are undertheorized. 
It does this by drawing on concepts of criminal law and tort law, as well as 
corrective justice and remedies. The below subsections set out the case for 
 
188. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 186, art. 5(1); Amendment to the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990 [hereinafter London 
Amendments] (amending the Montreal Protocol to make a special provision to meet the needs of 
developing countries, including the provision of financial resources and access to relevant 
technologies, as well as granting them a ten-year grace period for compliance), in Report of the 
Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, arts. 5, 10, U.N. Doc. EP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (1990). 
189. See London Amendments, supra note 188, art. 10 (describing the operation of the 
Multilateral Fund). 
190. Susan E. Strahan & Anne R. Douglass, Decline in Antarctic Ozone Depletion and Lower 
Stratospheric Chlorine Determined from Aura Microwave Limb Sounder Observations, 45 
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 382, 382, 388 (2018) (noting that a decline in ozone-depleting 
chemicals has resulted in 20% less depletion since 2005). 
191. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 187, at 644. 
192. Samson Reiny, NASA Study: First Direct Proof of Ozone Hole Recovery Due to Chemicals 
Ban, NASA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2018/nasa-study-first-direct-
proof-of-ozone-hole-recovery-due-to-chemicals-ban [https://perma.cc/YBK8-PV6M]. 
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expanding “common” and the case for expanding “differentiation” based on 
need, culpability, and capacity within the CBDR framework.  
  
 1.  The Case for Expanding “Common.”—The first element of CBDR, 
“common,” conventionally describes the shared obligations of two or more 
states towards the protection of an environmental resource.193 But, there is no 
reason why “common” could not apply to other resources that are shared, like 
global public health, either because the resource is not sufficiently under the 
control of a state, or is under the sovereign control of a state but subject to a 
common legal interest.194 Indeed, the ordinary meaning of “common” 
highlights the public aspect of the term and defines it as “of or relating to a 
community at large.”195 Similarly, legal definitions also indicate that, when 
used as an adjective, “common” is something that is “shared amongst 
several” or “owned by several jointly.”196 Thus, we could conceive of the 
shared good of environmental protection being akin to the shared good of 
protection from disease. 
Both environmental protection and protection from disease are global 
public goods197 that are subject to common legal interests. Certainly, disease 
eradication has been identified as a “weakest link global public good” 
because international cooperation can be undermined by a single weak link 
or uncooperative actor.198 Yet, disease eradication shares several similarities 
with aggregate effort public goods, like ozone layer protection, in that 
participation of all states is required for effective provision. Despite the 
different typology for conceptualizing disease eradication and ozone 
protection as public goods, the two areas have much more in common than 
the weakest-link and aggregate-effort public good categories indicate.199 
Namely, aggregate efforts like ozone fortification “can be undermined by 
 
193. CBDR: ORIGINS AND SCOPE, supra note 26. 
194. See, e.g., SANDS, supra note 175, at 286 (describing a common responsibility as applying 
when a “resource” is subject to a common legal interest but is not under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of a single state). 
195. Common, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/common [https://perma.cc/D3KW-3DWH]. 
196. Common, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/common/ 
[https://perma.cc/M9EB-WKEP]. 
197. See SANDS, supra note 175, at 277 (citing the Beef Hormones case, where the European 
Community prohibited the import of beef from the United States and Canada because of potential 
health concerns regarding the use of artificial hormones, as an example of the precautionary 
principle); see also J. Samuel Barkin & Yuliya Rashchupkina, Public Goods, Common Pool 
Resources, and International Law, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 376, 381 (2017) (arguing that disease 
eradication and climate change are examples of public goods that show the overlap between 
“weakest link” goods and “aggregate effort” goods). 
198. SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE? THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC 
GOODS 47 (2007). 
199. Barkin & Rashchupkina, supra note 197, at 381. 
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weak links,” and for public goods like “disease eradication, efforts short of 
total success will still yield benefits, meaning that . . . aggregate effort 
matters.”200 
States are beginning to recognize that highly-infectious diseases pose 
severe risks for the entire world.201 States have also recently recognized that 
highly-infectious diseases present serious challenges to developmental 
goals.202 In addition, states have acknowledged that certain “diseases and 
other emerging health challenges require a sustained international 
response.”203 Stakeholders are also starting to identify the linkages between 
infectious disease and climate change given the anticipated escalating costs 
of addressing infectious diseases known to be climate sensitive, such as 
Cholera, malaria, Dengue fever, and other viral diseases.204 Certainly, 
warmer weather linked with climate change allows mosquitos and other 
insects to breed and transmit diseases faster. This means that new diseases 
will show up in places that they have not been, like Zika, and that other 
established infectious diseases will continue to grow in places where they 
have been.205 In the United States alone, the number of insect-borne illness 
cases that individuals reported to the Center for Disease Control tripled from 
2004 to 2016.206 The increase in the number of reported cases may simply 
reflect the increase in testing and reporting or the increase in jet travel that 
facilitates the easy transmission of diseases, but the influence of a warming 
climate on these trends cannot be easily discounted. Indeed, studies have 
shown that warmer weather is assisting the spread of infectious diseases in 
other wealthy countries as well.207 When facing common risks in other 
contexts, states have recommended that all actors “cooperate in a spirit of 
global partnership.”208 Thus, a CBDR framework for highly-infectious 
 
200. Id. 
201. The Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2177, which states “that the unprecedented 
extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security.” S.C. 
Res. 2177, pmbl. (Sept. 18, 2014). 
202. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 145, ¶ 57 (noting the significant effects that HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, tuberculosis, and other diseases have on health). 
203. Id. 
204. See REG’L OFFICE FOR SOUTH-EAST ASIA, WORLD HEALTH ORG., REGIONAL STRATEGY 
FOR PROTECTING HEALTH FROM CLIMATE CHANGE 62–63 (2013) (projecting the costs of 
managing additional climate change-related cases of certain diseases). 
205. For further discussion, see Nick Watts et al., The Lancet Countdown on Health and 
Climate Change: From 25 Years of Inaction to a Global Transformation for Public Health, 391 
LANCET GLOBAL HEALTH 581, 589 (2018) (analyzing the health effects of climate change and the 
health implications of the Paris Agreement’s implementation). 
206. Ronald Rosenberg et al., Vital Signs: Trends in Reported Vectorborne Disease Cases—
United States and Territories, 2004–2016, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 496, 498 (2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/wr/mm6717e1.htm [https://perma.cc/539G-YHVQ]. 
207. See Watts et al., supra note 205, at 589 (finding that climate change influences infectious 
disease emergence and incidence globally). 
208. Rep. of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20, at 
51 (Sept. 2, 2002), modified, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20/Corr.1 (2003). 
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diseases is a logical conceptual expansion and provides a method for 
addressing mutual risks posed by epidemics. 
  
 2.  The Case for Expanding “Differentiation.”—The second element of 
CBDR is “but differentiated responsibility.” The plain meaning of “but” is 
“except for the fact,”209 while the ordinary meaning of “differentiate” is “to 
mark or show a difference.”210 Legal definitions of “responsibility” speak to 
“the obligation to answer for an act done, and to repair any injury it may have 
caused.”211 Reading all the definitions of the component parts of CBDR 
together yields: something relating to a community at large or that is shared 
amongst several, except for the fact to mark or show a difference in the 
obligation to answer for an act done, and to repair any injury it may have 
caused. Nothing warrants restricting this definition to the realm of 
international environmental law.212 In fact, the second element of the 
principle of CBDR is reflected in many areas of international law. For 
example, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the enabling 
clause inculcates a system of preferences wherein “parties may accord 
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without 
according such treatment to other contracting parties.”213 Additionally, the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures allows developing 
countries to request time-limited exemptions from their obligations geared 
towards food safety and animal and plant health, and it requires developed 
countries to consider providing technical assistance to exporting countries in 
order to allow them to meet any standards set by the importing developed 
country.214 Differential obligations are also found in the intellectual property 
regime to address public health problems posed by epidemic diseases. For 
example, the Doha Declaration reaffirms the commitment of countries in the 
Global North to provide incentives to corporations and other institutions to 
promote and encourage technology transfer to countries in the Global 
 
209. But, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 168 (11th ed. 2006). 
210. Differentiate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 348 (11th ed. 2006). 
211. Responsibility, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/responsibility/ 
[https://perma.cc/V3NL-VTK2]. 
212. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea pmbl., Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 (accounting for the interests and needs of developing countries); General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade art. XXXVI(8), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (noting that 
when granting concessions developed countries should not demand that developing countries 
reciprocate). 
213. Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT (Doc. L/4903) B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), 
at 203–18 (1980). 
214. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures pmbl., arts. 9–10, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493. 
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South.215 The Declaration also allowed for the phasing in of obligations under 
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement216 with 
respect to pharmaceutical products for the least-developed country members 
until January 1, 2016, without prejudice to their right to seek further 
extensions.217 Consequently, the second element of the CBDR framework is 
already influential in many areas of law and is ripe for further development. 
Undoubtedly, there are several norms underpinning the differentiated-
responsibility element of CBDR that need elaboration. Particularly 
instructive is the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, 
which states that developed countries shall acknowledge the “special 
situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed 
and those most environmentally vulnerable, [and that they] shall be given 
special priority.”218 The Declaration provides that: 
In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. 
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear 
in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the 
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they command.219 
The Declaration mentions three distinct normative bases for 
differentiation: need, culpability, and capacity. The next subsections will take 
up and develop each axis of differentiation and make the case for expansion 
of the CBDR framework to global public health. 
 a. Differentiation Based on Need.—The first rationale for differentiation 
in the Rio Declaration distinguishes the needs of developing, the least 
developed, and vulnerable countries from developed countries.220 Expanding 
this rationale of differentiation to combat highly-infectious diseases means 
there would be disparate levels of responsibility for addressing epidemics, 
which would correspond with varying levels of social, economic, and health 
needs. 
 
215. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health of 14 November 2001 ¶ 7, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 ILM 755 (2002) [hereinafter 
Doha Declaration]. 
216. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 65(2), 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (granting extra implementation 
time to developing countries); id. art. 66(1) (delaying indefinitely implementation for the least-
developed countries); id. art. 66(2) (obliging developed countries to provide incentives to 
“enterprises and institutions in their territories” for technology transfer to developing countries to 
“enable them to create a sound and viable technological base”). 
217. Doha Declaration, supra note 215, ¶ 7. 
218. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development princ. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) 
[hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
219. Id. princ. 7. 
220. Id. princ. 6. 
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Undeniably, need-based claims for differentiation are hardly new; much 
legal and philosophical ink has been spilled on claims grounded in the duty 
to rescue.221 The normative justification for differentiation on this ground is 
straightforward—morally, we have a responsibility to help those in need. 
Need-based claims often run headfirst into the so-called slippery slope, in 
that vulnerable countries are faced with many needs, not just risks posed by 
epidemics. If need-based claims for differentiation were accepted, the 
practical implications for law-and-policy making in global public health 
would be substantial, but surmountable, as the status quo distribution of need 
is avoidable under a more just international order. Although the political 
appetite may be low, the effort to do so would be minimal. For example, a 
mere 0.1% of the gross national income of sixty-six high-income economies 
is all that would be needed to meet the core obligations of the right to 
health.222 Certainly, eliminating deprivation globally is achievable 
collectively, as substantial improvements in the living conditions in the 
Global South are possible at small opportunity costs to those in the Global 
North.223 
The countries where the Cholera and Ebola epidemics occurred 
certainly meet the criterion of need. In the aftermath of the conflicts in 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and before the 2010 earthquake in Haiti 
hit, many vital state institutions were nonexistent or significantly 
weakened.224 The epidemics were able to wreak such havoc in large part 
 
221. See generally, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Why Rich Countries Should Care About the 
World’s Least Healthy People, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 89 (2007) (highlighting national interests 
and ethics as reasons why wealthy countries should be concerned with global health); Bhikhu 
Parekh, Cosmopolitanism and Global Citizenship, 29 REV. INT’L STUD. 3 (2003) (discussing the 
ethical obligations individuals have to those inside and outside of their communities); Thomas W. 
Pogge, Responsibilities for Poverty-Related Ill Health, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 71 (2002) 
(contending that those involved in upholding institutions that contribute to illness around the world 
have a responsibility to prevent and mitigate it). But see Mathias Risse, What We Owe to the Global 
Poor, 9 J. ETHICS 81 (2005) (denying the existence of far-reaching redistributive duties to the global 
poor). 
222. E.g., G. Ooms & R. Hammonds, Taking Up Daniels’ Challenge: The Case for Global 
Health Justice, 12 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 29, 37 (2010). 
223. “Doubling the wealth of all in the bottom two quintiles would take only 1.55 percent of 
the wealth of the top 1 percent of the human population.” Thomas Pogge, Growth is Good! – But 
What Growth?, in SOCIAL JUSTICE, GLOBAL DYNAMICS: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 77, 87 (Ayelet Banai, Mirian Ronzoni & Christian Schemmel eds., 2011); see also 
Robert Beaglehole et al., Prevention of Chronic Diseases: A Call to Action, 370 LANCET GLOBAL 
HEALTH 2152, 2152 (2007) (finding that a small set of interventions in twenty-three low-income 
and middle-income countries in 2005 would have cost approximately USD 5.8 billion to achieve 
the global goal for prevention and control of chronic diseases). 
224. See SUSAN E. RICE & STEWART PATRICK, BROOKINGS INST., INDEX OF STATE 
WEAKNESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 3, 39 (2008) [hereinafter INDEX OF STATE WEAKNESS] 
(ranking all 141 developing countries according to their performance in four key areas—economics, 
politics, security, and social welfare). It ranked Liberia ninth, Haiti twelfth, Sierra Leone thirteenth, 
and Guinea twenty-third (with a lower ranking representing poorer performance). Id. at 10, 39. 
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because these are some of the poorest countries in the world.225 For example, 
even though Liberia and Sierra Leone had some of the highest growth rates 
globally, the vast majority of people’s lived experiences were defined by 
continued or growing poverty prior to Ebola.226 Liberia ranks 177 out of 188 
countries on the U.N. Development Program’s Human Development Index 
(HDI)227 for 2014, in front of Sierra Leone at 181 and Guinea at 182.228 
Comparatively, prior to the Cholera epidemic in Haiti in 2010, the HDI 
ranked Haiti 145 out of 169 countries.229 The level of susceptibility in all four 
countries to infectious diseases when the outbreaks occurred was dismal. The 
percentage of public health expenditures relative to gross domestic product 
that all four countries spent on health prior to the epidemics paled in 
comparison to countries with the highest human development.230 Examining 
the relative deprivation and susceptibility to outbreaks in all countries prior 
to the Cholera and Ebola epidemics reveals a key insight for the theory of 
CBDR. The CBDR framework must also consider relative health needs, that 
is, a determination of the resources (or lack thereof) to mitigate the risks from 
epidemics, as opposed to simply focusing on absolute need. 
Differentiation based on need within the CBDR framework would mean 
that states, international organizations, and other nonstate actors would have 
a moral and undoubtedly contested legal duty to recognize and act upon the 
threats posed by epidemics like Cholera and Ebola. This legal duty as applied 
to highly-infectious diseases could be based in part on norms of international 
cooperation that already exist in international law. Arguably, the U.N. 
Charter requires member states to provide international assistance and 
 
225. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2015: WORK FOR 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 228–29 (2015) [hereinafter HD REPORT 2015] (noting that between 2004 
and 2014, 52.9% of the population lived below the national poverty line in Sierra Leone, 55.2% did 
in Guinea, 58.5% in Haiti, and 63.8% in Liberia). 
226. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: RECOVERY STRENGTHENS, 
REMAINS UNEVEN 69, 186 (2014) (classifying Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea as low-income 
countries as determined by GDP, consumer prices, current account balance, and unemployment). 
227. The HDI assesses health deprivations by considering life expectancy, but it also examines 
health outcomes like infants lacking immunizations and deaths due to certain infectious diseases 
like malaria and tuberculosis, as well as measuring HIV prevalence. 
228. HD REPORT 2015, supra note 225, at 210. 
229. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: THE REAL 
WEALTH OF NATIONS: PATHWAYS TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 150 (2010) [hereinafter HD REPORT 
2010]. 
230. Compare UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016: 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT FOR EVERYONE 226, 229 (2016) (noting that in 2014, Norway and Australia 
ranked the first and second in human development, respectively spending 8.3% and 6.3% of their 
GDP on public health, while Liberia ranked 177 and spent 3.2%, Guinea ranked 183 and spent 2.7%, 
and Sierra Leone ranked 179 and spent 1.9%), with UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013: THE RISE OF THE SOUTH: HUMAN PROGRESS IN A DIVERSE WORLD 
162, 164 (2013) (noting that in 2010, Norway and Australia ranked first and second for human 
development, respectively spending 6.4%–8.0% and 5.4%–5.9% of their GDP on public health, 
while Haiti spent 1.5%–1.7% of its GDP, Liberia spent 1.3%–3.9%, Guinea spent 0.6%–0.7%, and 
Sierra Leone spent 1.1%–1.5%). 
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cooperation. Under Article 56 of the Charter, members are “to take joint and 
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of 
the purposes set forth in Article 55.”231 And Article 55 provides that the U.N. 
shall promote “solutions of international economic, social, health, and related 
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation.”232 Article 
55 also provides in relevant part that the U.N. should promote higher 
standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development as well as universal respect for and observance of human 
rights.233 Reading these provisions together provides a basis to argue that 
states are obligated under the Charter to cooperate with the U.N. and other 
actors to prevent, detect, and arrest pandemics. Several scholars are of the 
view that the Charter does not legally empower the U.N. to force member 
states to aid.234 That states are not subject to compulsion, however, does not 
mean that they are not under an obligation to act. 
Notwithstanding the ostensible lack of binding obligations, there are 
promising recent developments that reflect the expanded CBDR approach. 
For instance, the Global Health Security Agenda was created in 2014 in the 
midst of the Ebola epidemic and endorsed by the Group of Seven Nations 
(G-7).235 Its goal is to “advance a world safe and secure from infectious 
disease threats, to bring together nations from all over the world to make new, 
concrete commitments, and to elevate global health security as a national 
leaders-level priority.”236 Membership in the GHSA is open to all countries, 
and currently nearly 50 nations are members,237 along with international 
organizations like the WHO, the Economic Community of West African 
States, and the European Union, as well as nongovernmental stakeholders.238 
It is a completely voluntary initiative wherein countries endeavor to make 
commitments to prevent, detect, and respond to threats whether naturally 
occurring, deliberate, or accidental that arise from highly-infectious diseases. 
One of the key aspects is the external evaluation tool’s ability to highlight 
 
231. U.N. Charter art. 56. 
232. Id. art. 55(b). 
233. Id. art. 55(a), (c). 
234. See Malcolm Langford et al., Extraterritorial Duties in International Law (describing one 
scholar’s view that the Charter serves to promote rather than to enforce), in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE 
DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 54–55 (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2013). 
235. GHSA About, supra note 29. 
236. Id. 
237. Id.; see also Membership, GLOB. HEALTH SEC. AGENDA [hereinafter Membership], 
https://www.ghsagenda.org/members [https://perma.cc/8ZEK-J8DF] (listing current member-
states). Notably, Haiti only recently became a member of the GHSA, joining Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and Guinea. 
238. GHSA About, supra note 29. 
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gaps and needs for current and prospective donors, as well as to inform and 
assist country-level planning and priority setting.239 
The GHSA differentiates based on need. The countries most impacted 
by Ebola—Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea—joined and have experienced 
improvement.240 For example, during the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone in 
November of 2015, only 35% of health facilities reported to their respective 
districts.241 By September 2016, with the help of the GHSA, this increased to 
96% of health facilities.242 Early indications similarly show the initiative’s 
impact in Liberia. Prior to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Liberia had very few 
trained “disease detectives,” but with the initiative’s support at the end of 
2016, it had approximately 115 trained “detectives” covering all fifteen 
counties and ninety-two health districts.243 This progress will likely assist 
with early detection of epidemic diseases in the sub-region. The GHSA 
incorporates an important aspect of the CBDR framework. 
Differentiating based on relative health needs makes intuitive sense 
because while public health risks are distributed across all nations, some 
nations are more needful of assistance than others and are especially 
vulnerable to epidemics. Differentiating responsibility based on need makes 
clear that the basis for obligations of international assistance and cooperation 
does not depend on whether an actor has contributed to the resulting harm. 
At the same time, meeting the global need required to address epidemic 
diseases requires more than the resources of any one state, as such obligations 
to cooperate must be shared and differentiated not only based on need244 but 
also based on culpability and capacity. The next subsections take up both in 
turn. 
  
 b. Differentiation Based on Culpability.—The second rationale for 
differentiation in the Rio Declaration recognizes countries’ responsibility for 
different contributions to global environmental degradation.245 Expanding 
this rationale to global public health affords a basis for differentiation based 
 
239. Assessments & JEE, GLOB. HEALTH SEC. AGENDA, 
https://www.ghsagenda.org/assessments [https://perma.cc/G8JH-5T55]. 
240. Membership, supra note 237; see, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., JOINT EXTERNAL 
EVALUATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA: MISSION REPORT 4, 16 (2016) (indicating that Liberia 
has made significant structural improvements in the wake of the Ebola epidemic). 
241. GLOB. HEALTH SEC. AGENDA, ADVANCING THE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA: 
PROGRESS AND EARLY IMPACT FROM U.S. INVESTMENT 7 [hereinafter ADVANCING THE GLOBAL 
HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA], https://www.ghsagenda.org/docs/default-source/default-document-
library/ghsa-legacy-report.pdf?sfvrsn=12 [https://perma.cc/TLM5-SLHQ]. 
242. Id. at 7. 
243. Id. at 10. 
244. Margot E. Salomon, How to Keep Promises: Making Sense of the Duty Among Multiple 
States to Fulfill Socio-Economic Rights in the World, in DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 366, 381. 
245. Rio Declaration, supra note 218, princ. 7. 
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on an assessment of those who contributed to highly-infectious diseases and 
calls for a concomitant apportionment of responsibility to repair the harm 
caused. Under a CBDR framework to combat epidemics, dissimilar levels of 
responsibility would be allocated based on the culpability of actors. 
Under a culpability analysis, the emphasis changes from a focus on the 
obligations to succor to the conditions that created the epidemic. 
Differentiating based on culpability would not leave states solely responsible 
for addressing health inequities that exist, in part because of the structuring 
of the international system like other frameworks.246 CBDR would 
necessitate determining the culpability of international actors in facilitating 
global health inequities. This is particularly important when one considers 
that a fundamental norm that is being violated with epidemic diseases is the 
failure to comply with an obligation to assist and cooperate internationally.247 
Accordingly, a culpability analysis under CBDR should look to such factors 
like the power an actor wields to influence international affairs and its ability 
or inability to shape the international trade, investment, finance, intellectual 
property, development, and global public health regimes, among others, that 
create conditions for epidemics to spread. 
The culpability analysis should be wide-ranging. As such, it cannot be 
limited to situations where it is the actor’s purpose or conscious objective to 
perform an action that causes harm. Additionally, it cannot simply 
contemplate situations where an actor has knowledge that its conduct will 
cause a result, but the actor is indifferent to that result. Nor can the analysis 
be restricted to reckless actors that are aware of the strong possibility that 
their behavior will produce harm but discount the risks and proceed. A 
thorough culpability analysis must also account for situations of negligence 
where the actor is unaware and inadvertently creates a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of harm. Objectively, negligent actors are deemed 
responsible because they fail to perceive risks, and their failure is a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable actor in the same 
situation would exercise. A culpability analysis that accounts for the above 
mental states will sufficiently capture direct and indirect action witnessed 
with structural harms like epidemics. 
Notably, the broad culpability analysis proposed herein is not a method 
for imposing a form of strict liability that merely requires an action and a 
harmful result. Strict liability is an exceptional form of responsibility 
domestically and internationally, reserved for actors who act without a 
culpable mental state. Strict liability may seem attractive because it is a 
method of ensuring that an individual actor’s behavior complies with the law 
and causes no harm to others. But it is unduly harsh and runs against the main 
purpose of the framework by allocating responsibility for every harm without 
 
246. Cf. discussion supra subsection III(B)(2)(a) (discussing the U.N. Charter’s obligation). 
247. Salomon, supra note 244, at 373. 
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distinction. Embedded within differentiating responsibility based on 
culpability is the implicit understanding that more culpable or blameworthy 
actors should be assigned more responsibility, and less blameworthy actors 
should be assigned less responsibility. Thus, strict liability is inapposite 
because it fails to distinguish between levels of culpability. 
There may still be trepidation that increasing culpability in this manner 
may create perverse disincentives for actors to render voluntary assistance or 
consent to more robust responsibility norms. However, the conclusion that a 
more wide-ranging conception of culpability should not be imposed does not 
follow from this concern. That is, society may be better off when more care 
is taken in the provision of public benefits like aid.248 Accordingly, an 
expanded CBDR framework that causes negligent and other culpable actors 
to internalize the detrimental effects of external costs imposed would be 
better overall for society because it would incentivize more careful policies 
and actions. 
The following subsections address two related issues: the need to 
account for the multiplicity of actors causing an epidemic and the need to 
account for historical culpability. 
  
 i. Culpability and Too Many Hands.—CBDR must consider the 
multiplicity of actors that may or may not act in concert to produce an 
epidemic. Instances of concerted and independent but cumulative action are 
termed “the problem of too many hands” to characterize the difficulty that 
arises when too many actors are involved in the process that caused the 
harm.249 The problem of “too many hands” may also lead to challenges in 
identifying what actor is responsible for what due to lack of information or 
knowledge about a given situation.250 
A narrow reading of causation would stop at the following inquiry: if 
the actor refrained from action, would the result have occurred anyway? 
However, causation so narrowly understood cannot offer the primary basis 
for attributing responsibility under this framework, especially because 
epidemics involve structural causes. Due to overdetermination, different 
questions apply than the traditional but-for test. Instead, the inquiry should 
consider the following: 
 
248. Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 142. 
249. See, e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of 
Many Hands, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905, 905 (1980) (noting the “problem of too many hands” 
where several public officials contribute to a decision and it becomes “difficult in principle to 
identify who is morally responsible for political outcomes”). 
250. See Nollkaemper, supra note 66, at 296 (examining the problem of the information gap 
between parties when assigning responsibility). 
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(1) whether the actors’ actions were a substantial factor in producing 
the result, regardless of whether the outcome might have occurred 
anyway; 
(2) whether the actors’ actions hastened the result; or 
(3) whether the actors’ actions make survival less likely as a result.251 
These queries are important because without examining them one would tend 
to stop at the first-level question—whether the result would have occurred 
but for the actors’ actions. 
The avoidable deaths and the infringement of the right to health that 
took place during the Cholera epidemic were the result of cumulative action 
from too many hands.252 If the traditional but-for test is used, it appears the 
outcome would have occurred regardless of most actors’ actions. Such a 
causal analysis would consider the Nepalese government for the actions of 
its military personnel, the U.N. for insufficient monitoring of its bases and 
contractors, the Haitian contractor for disposing of waste improperly near the 
base, and the Haitian government for failing to provide a safe system for 
providing drinking water. Under a superficial but-for analysis, perhaps only 
the Nepalese government is determined to be the but-for cause. The 
substantial actions of the U.N., Haitian government, and contractor 
seemingly made no difference to the resulting epidemic. That analysis would 
elide the realities of highly-infectious diseases. Instead, considering whether 
the above actors’ actions were a substantial factor in producing or hastening 
the result, or made survival less likely, regardless of whether the outcome 
might have occurred anyway, are more appropriate inquiries. Because 
epidemic diseases are characterized by overdetermination, it is critical to 
delve deeper than when ordinarily conceptualizing causation. Failure to ask 
the right queries may lead to inaccuracies in identifying what actors are 
responsible.253 Similarly, simply focusing on the bad governance of countries 
or the recent history of conflicts in the West African subregion may obscure 
the role of international actors who championed neoliberal reform policies 
like structural adjustment, which contributed to the Ebola epidemic amongst 
others.254 This legacy, concomitant with narrow post-conflict reconstruction 
 
251. JENS OHLIN, CRIMINAL LAW: DOCTRINE, APPLICATION, AND PRACTICE 192, 198 (2016). 
252. For further discussion, see supra section II(B)(1) (discussing the causal actors responsible 
for the Cholera epidemic in Haiti). 
253. Cf. Nollkaemper, supra note 66, at 289–97 (addressing the ways in which there can be a 
gap in responsibility because of the difficulties in apportioning responsibility among multiple 
actors). 
254. For further discussion, see infra subsection III(B)(2)(b)(ii); see also Sirleaf, supra note 22, 
at 495–97 (analyzing how policies like structural adjustments “have slowed down improvements in, 
or worsened, the health status of people in countries implementing them”). 
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efforts, combined to marginalize the health sector and undermine state 
capacity to respond to epidemic diseases.255 
When determining responsibility, causation cannot be established if the 
result is so remote that it makes holding the actor accountable illegitimate.256 
The requirement of a direct causal link that is foreseeable or proximate to 
hold an actor responsible for an injury is a fundamental principle of 
international law.257 Direct factors that should be relevant under an expanded 
CBDR framework include the contribution that an actor has made to the 
emergence of an epidemic. A thorough culpability analysis also considers the 
direct actions or omissions—be they international or internal with 
extraterritorial effect—that had reasonably foreseeable consequences—that 
resulted in an epidemic. For instance, it was clearly foreseeable that Cholera 
would result from the Nepalese government’s failure to properly screen its 
troops for Cholera before deployment, the U.N.’s inadequate supervision of 
contractors and insufficient monitoring at its base, the Haitian contractor’s 
improper disposal of waste, and the Haitian government’s failure to provide 
safe drinking water. Accordingly, it is fair to find the above actors as 
proximate causes for Cholera in Haiti and hold them responsible. The broader 
conceptualization of culpability articulated above allows for responsibility to 
be attributed to multiple actors. 
  
 ii. Lengthening the Historical Gaze of Culpability.—The CBDR 
framework must also necessarily lengthen the causal gaze temporally to fully 
account for historical harms, as opposed to pretending that the status quo 
distribution of highly-infectious diseases is simply due to erratic nature or 
bad luck. This approach would assign contemporary obligations not only 
because of today’s harms but also based on historical responsibility for past 
exploitation, as well as the persistence of the deprivation of the right to health. 
“While undeniably the spread of [epidemics] is due to a combination of 
domestic factors,” both current and historical, “the tendency has been to 
focus almost exclusively on local actors and [more contemporary] factors as 
a way to distance, differentiate, and other the spread of disease.”258 
 
255. Muriu, supra note 125, at 401–02 (describing how private actors are taking over areas 
traditionally reserved to the state, resulting in the state’s diminished ability to adequately provide 
for its citizens’ health and economic well-being). 
256. OHLIN, supra note 251, at 209. 
257. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 60, at 91–93 (noting that the 
requirement of a causal link is not the same for every international obligation but that a sufficient 
causal nexus is a general requirement). 
258. Sirleaf, supra note 22, at 512 (citing Obijiofor Aginam, International Law, HIV/AIDS, and 
Human Rights in Africa: A Post-Colonial Discourse, 100 PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 350, 351 
(2006) (discussing the rhetoric on HIV/AIDS as a unique problem to “‘[s]avage’ African cultures 
that encourage promiscuity, male domination, polygamous relationships, infidelity, and wife 
inheritance”)). 
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This subsection demonstrates how international actors are historically 
responsible for the vulnerability of the West African subregion that enabled 
the spread of Ebola.259 Following the implementation of structural adjustment 
programs beginning in the 1980s, NGOs overtook most of the basic welfare 
functions of public health provision.260 The beleaguered health systems 
enabled by structural adjustment were further degenerated following 
conflicts in the subregion. U.N. agencies, donor countries, and several 
international NGOs spearheaded the post-conflict recovery process in the 
subregion in the 2000s. They neglected restructuring the economic and social 
sectors in the subregion, which rendered already fragile countries ill-
equipped to deal with Ebola and indirectly facilitated its spread. The United 
Nations missions in Liberia and in Sierra Leone led the loose coalition of 
organizations, which became responsible for managing the state and the 
health care sector.261 
In many ways, this network voluntarily assumed care and functioned as 
the de facto government during post-conflict reconstruction. The fragility of 
this system of health care provision was apparent in 2007 when Doctors 
Without Borders left Liberia following the conflict. The lack of the vital 
services they provided resulted in the immediate closure of regional and 
urban hospitals.262 This, concomitant with the closure of thirty NGO-run 
clinics in the country, undermined the already teetering system.263 Following 
the conflicts, aid organizations delivered more and more services to the poor 
because some of the governments in the subregion were shrinking their 
spending on public health.264 This meant that prior to the epidemic, public 
health facilities were regarded as places to be avoided and even resisted in 
the subregion.265 
 
259. For further discussion, see Sirleaf, supra note 22, at 500–03 (tying West Africa’s fractured 
healthcare system to failed international post-conflict reconstruction attempts). 
260. See Tsung-Ling Lee, Making International Health Regulations Work: Lessons from the 
2014 Ebola Outbreak, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 931, 972 (2016) (“[T]he World Bank’s 
involvement in health and economic projects in Africa contributed to the diminishing role of the 
state as the primary provider of healthcare and other basic social welfare.”). 
261. See Sharon Abramowitz, How the Liberian Health Sector Became a Vector for Ebola, 
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (Oct. 7, 2014), https://culanth.org/fieldsights/598-how-the-liberian-
health-sector-became-a-vector-for-ebola [https://perma.cc/GHW3-L8TZ] (chronicling 
international involvements in the post-conflict Liberian healthcare system). 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. See United Nations Dev. Program, Human Development Data 1990–2015, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data [https://perma.cc/95GX-4FX3] (noting that Liberia decreased its 
percentage of GDP dedicated to public health expenditures from 3.9% in 2011 to 3.2% in 2014 (the 
year the Ebola epidemic occurred), Sierra Leone decreased from 2.6% in 2011 to 1.9% in 2014, and 
Guinea increased from 2.0% in 2011 to 2.7% in 2014). 
265. See Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 110, at 142 (discussing the causes and consequences 
of government underfunding of the health-care system). 
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This fractured system of health care delivery created conditions that 
facilitated Ebola’s spread by accelerating the harm caused by the virus and/
or reducing the likelihood of survival due to the lack of resilient health 
systems. The counterargument is that one can never know what would have 
happened if international actors had not intervened in the subregion. On this 
view, it is possible the epidemic might have been much worse but for 
structural adjustment or post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It is futile to 
attempt to disprove a counterfactual given the impossibility of knowing what 
would occur in this alternative universe and the inability of conducting a 
social experiment. More importantly, it seems clear that these interventions 
were at least substantial factors in producing the increased susceptibility to 
Ebola in the subregion and contributing to serious adverse consequences. 
A crucial theoretical insight gleaned from the analysis above is that 
epidemics require more than simply a tort- or criminal-law evaluation of 
causation. Accordingly, the theoretical framework developed herein 
considers a global historical perspective, as well as moral and political 
evaluations of responsibility.266 A nonexhaustive list of factors that should be 
considered in determining historical responsibility includes whether the 
harmful effects of past actions are traceable to current epidemics and/or 
whether the external actor gained unjust enrichment or benefit as the result 
of its past misdeeds. 
Unsurprisingly, actors in the Global South will be the most vocal 
proponents of historical responsibility as a ground of differentiating 
culpability,267 while actors in the Global North will tend to be the most hostile 
or ambivalent to it. There are numerous studies that have demonstrated the 
long-term detrimental consequences of the legacies of slavery and 
colonialism on the current economic performance and position of countries 
in the Global South.268 For actors in the Global South, the way things are—
the status quo—remains the key issue.269 While in practice former colonial 
 
266. See, e.g., Christopher L. Kutz, Shared Responsibility for Climate Change: From Guilt to 
Taxes (taking up the debate between historical- and future-based allocation of responsibility in both 
an ethical and empirical dimension), in DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 17, at 341, 342. 
267. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development (Dec. 4, 1986) 
(concluding that the elimination of human rights violations against those peoples affected by 
colonialism and other forms of discrimination “would contribute to the establishment of 
circumstances propitious to the development of a great part of mankind”). 
268. See generally, e.g., Graziella Bertocchi, The Legacies of Slavery In and Out of Africa, 5 
IZA J. MIGRATION, no. 24, 2016, at 1 (illustrating the long-term consequences of the slave trade on 
contemporaneous socioeconomic outcomes); Babacar M’baye, The Economic, Political, and Social 
Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on Africa, 11 EURO. LEGACY 607 (2006) (explaining how the 
slave trade began “the systemic and continuous process of economic exploitation and social and 
political fragmentation that Europeans later institutionalized through colonization”); Nathan Nunn, 
The Long Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades, 123 Q.J. ECON. 139 (2008) (examining the 
relationship between Africa’s slave trade and its current underdevelopment). 
269. Stone, supra note 166, at 293. 
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powers tend to direct international assistance towards former colonial 
territories,270 it is not evident that this is out of a sense of historical 
responsibility for the position of former colonies. A common argument 
against claims of corrective justice is that the actors of today should not be 
held responsible for the sins of their predecessors. However, history must be 
owned. As far as historical responsibility can be traced to a common lineage, 
the bearers of that lineage must face the “future in the shadow of the 
collective past.”271 
To the extent that more backward-looking arguments for differentiating 
based on historical culpability are likely to meet resistance, a more forward-
looking approach might be more appealing. The alternative normative basis 
for differentiation based on historical responsibility would be to deter actors 
from engaging in harmful action in the future. Normative support can be 
located in the principle that actors should not benefit from their wrongdoing 
and should compensate those that have been harmed as a result of their 
actions.272 It may be easy for actors in the Global North to assert that bygones 
should be bygones when they continue to benefit from those bygones, while 
the detrimental consequences are experienced primarily elsewhere in the 
Global South. For example, countries in the industrialized North have 
contributed to huge disparities in historic emissions, which has led to 
substantial environmental degradation that is forecasted to increase if the 
current rate of emissions continues. The damage from a warming climate 
includes the increase in epidemics, as well as the exacerbation of already 
established infectious diseases. It is unjust for actors to benefit from the 
production and consumption of greenhouse gases and then diffuse the 
external harms. While the increased incidence of epidemics affects both 
industrialized and developing states, the detrimental consequences of these 
diseases will be more severe in the Global South. If the objective is to 
contribute to global justice,273 then we must create proper incentives and 
disincentives for actors such that they do not benefit from unjust 
enrichment.274 In some sense, historical responsibility as a basis for 
 
270. Salomon, supra note 244, at 375. 
271. Kutz, supra note 266, at 355. 
272. See Salomon, supra note 244, at 375 (arguing that those states responsible for causing 
harms are duty-bound to remedy them); Dinah Shelton, Describing the Elephant: International 
Justice and Environmental Law (“If such relations [between rich and poor countries] are unjust, 
moral reciprocity may require extensive redistribution of wealth.”), in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
JUSTICE IN CONTEXT 55, 61 (Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2009). 
273. There are several common objections to global justice claims. One view contends that 
global justice is meaningless because there is not a global social contract to make the concept 
enforceable. Another objection questions the existence of a normative consensus to support truly 
global perspectives on justice. 
274. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 121–22 (providing examples of how society can 
create incentives and disincentives for actors). 
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differentiation requires that actors internalize the detrimental effects that they 
impose on others.275 A deterrence rationale posits that it is only when actors 
take responsibility for their actions that future harm is likely to be avoided. 
Indeed, detrimental action without consequences does not usually get the 
incentives right.276 
In sum, the framework developed herein accounts for direct, indirect, 
and multiple causal factors, as well as historical responsibility as bases for 
culpability. Differentiation based on culpability shifts the framework from 
what the vulnerable need to an analysis of the actors that caused the 
contagion. This section demonstrates why differentiating responsibility 
based on culpability is justified. However, under international human rights 
law, states are under a positive obligation to act towards the fulfillment of 
socioeconomic rights irrespective of issues of causation.277 States also have 
a duty to address epidemics in global public health law, irrespective of a 
causal link. As such, a CBDR framework is warranted not only based on 
culpability but also based on capacity. 
  
 c. Differentiation Based on Capacity.—The final rationale for 
differentiation in the Rio Declaration disaggregates states with distinct 
capacities.278 Expanding CBDR in this vein would necessitate diverse levels 
of responsibility based on capacity to combat highly-infectious diseases. 
Capacity as used in this framework refers to the ability of an actor to detect, 
prevent, and control communicable diseases, as well as assist others in 
accomplishing these objectives. Differentiating based on capacity is reflected 
in human rights and global public health law. The normative justification for 
differentiation of responsibilities based on capacity is intuitive—if we want 
a reduction in epidemics, then we should allocate responsibility to those that 
are best placed to do so.279 Thus, under a CBDR approach, stakeholders in 
the Global North would be expected to take on special leadership roles based 
on their industrial development, experience with public health protection 
policies, greater wealth, technical expertise, and capacity to influence global 
decision-making. 
 
275. For further discussion, see generally, for example, R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1 (1960) (discussing how externalities can be internalized in the absence of 
transaction costs). 
276. See, e.g., van Aaken, supra note 103, at 186 (discussing the trade-off between the different 
goals of state responsibility). 
277. See ICESCR, supra note 39, art. 2(1) (mandating that each party to the Covenant take 
steps, “to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant”). 
278. Rio Declaration, supra note 218, princ. 7. 
279. See, e.g., David Miller, Distributing Responsibilities, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 453, 460–61 (2001) 
(“If we want bad situations put right, we should give the responsibility to those who are best placed 
to do the remedying.”). 
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An expanded CBDR framework should encapsulate prospective 
obligations to cooperate in the provision of international aid.280 The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stipulates 
that it is the obligation of all state parties, especially those with economic and 
technical capacity, to take steps towards the full realization of rights in the 
Covenant individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation.281 The Committee responsible for interpreting this Covenant has 
emphasized that “States parties should recognize the essential role of 
international cooperation and comply with their commitment to take joint and 
separate action to achieve the full realization of the right to health.”282 It 
asserts that states have an obligation subject to the availability of resources 
to “facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services in other 
countries, wherever possible, and [to] provide the necessary aid when 
required.”283 Additionally, this Committee has found that states have a “joint 
and individual responsibility,” under international law, “to cooperate in 
providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of 
emergency.”284 It has also found that states should contribute to this task to 
the maximum of their capacity, and should prioritize the provision of 
international medical aid, distribution and management of resources, and 
financial aid to the “most vulnerable or marginalized groups of the 
population.”285 Thus, the enforcement body responsible for ensuring 
compliance with the Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
explicitly recognizes parts of the CBDR framework, namely differentiation 
based on need and capacity. The following subsections address three related 
issues—the affected state’s capacity, external states’ capacity, and global 
capacity. 
  
 i. The Affected State’s Capacity.—Ideally, the affected state would have 
the most capacity to respond to epidemics. Global public health law provides 
states with a couple of years to make this ideal a reality. For example, the 
International Health Regulations require that each state party develop, 
strengthen, and maintain the capacity to detect, assess, notify, and report 
certain diseases within five years of its entry into force.286 States not able to 
meet their capacity obligations must show good cause and, in exceptional 
 
280. Cf. discussion supra subsection III(B)(2)(a) (discussing the U.N. Charter’s obligation). 
281. See ICESCR, supra note 39, arts. 2(1), 22–23 (establishing the obligation of the parties to 
take steps toward achieving full recognition of the rights laid out in the Covenant and discussing 
how these steps can be taken). 
282. General Comment No. 14, supra note 37, ¶ 38. 
283. Id. ¶ 39. 
284. Id. ¶ 40. 
285. Id. 
286. INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS, supra note 31, art. 5(1). 
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circumstances, are to receive an extension of up to four years.287 States are to 
develop capacities seemingly by fiat—“utiliz[ing] existing national 
structures and resources to meet their core capacity requirements.”288 States 
also have specific public health response capacities to develop under the 
International Health Regulations (IHR). This includes rapidly determining 
the control measures to prevent the domestic and international spread of 
disease; providing support and logistical assistance; providing an efficient 
means of communication with relevant stakeholders; and establishing, 
operating, and maintaining a public health emergency response plan.289 In 
2005, the WHO found that health capacities were nowhere near “a path to 
timely implementation worldwide.”290 By 2013, prior to the Ebola outbreak, 
no African state had fully implemented the IHR’s core capacity 
requirements.291 These gaps in core capacities were especially pronounced in 
the Ebola-affected countries.292 
Even in circumstances where states lack capacity, like with Ebola293 or 
Cholera,294 states still have obligations under human rights law. These 
obligations include monitoring the nonrealization of the right to health and 
devising strategies to promote the right,295 as well as protecting persons 
within their jurisdictions from infringement of the right to health by third 
parties.296 The determination of whether a state has taken all adequate and 
reasonable steps towards the progressive realization of the right to health 
includes the affected state seeking international cooperation to ensure the 
 
287. Id. art. 5(2). 
288. Id. Annex I(A) ¶ 1. 
289. Id. Annex I(A) ¶ 6. 
290. HARVEY FINEBERG, WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005) AND ON PANDEMIC 
INFLUENZA A (H1N1) 2009 (2011), http://www.who.int/ihr/WHA64_10_HVF_2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6XC3-L26A]. 
291. See Hoffman, supra note 21, at 239 (stating that many countries did not meet 2012 
requirements and requested extensions). 
292. See discussion supra subsection III(B)(2)(a) (discussing the limited capacity and 
susceptibility to outbreak of Ebola-affected countries prior to the Ebola epidemic). For further 
discussion, see Sirleaf, supra note 22, at 491–97 (analyzing how underdevelopment shaped the 
trajectory of sub-Saharan Africa with respect to disease-outbreak vulnerability). 
293. Margaret Chan, Director-General of the WHO, asserted that Ebola-affected countries 
simply do not have the capacity to manage an outbreak of this size and complexity on their own and 
urged the international community to provide support. See Sarah Boseley, Ebola: Government Cuts 
to the WHO Aided Delays in Dealing with Outbreak, GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/09/ebola-who-government-cuts-delays-in-dealing-
with-outbreak [https://perma.cc/TE2L-Z5UF]. 
294. See discussion supra subsection III(B)(2)(a). 
295. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights) ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
296. General Comment No. 14, supra note 37, ¶ 51. 
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protection needed from highly-infectious diseases.297 All of the affected 
governments sought international assistance for combating Cholera298 and 
Ebola.299 Accordingly, the Haitian, Liberian, Sierra Leonean, and Guinean 
states met their human rights obligations relating to epidemics. The 
determination regarding the affected state’s inability or unwillingness to take 
steps to prevent, treat, and control epidemics should not be overstated—its 
legal relevance goes to the affected state’s failure to meet its primary human 
rights obligations.300 It is not dispositive as to the assignment of secondary 
duties to external states, which is to be determined by the failure of the 
rightsholders to exercise their rights.301 In other words, “the principles 
governing the determination of responsibility are irrelevant for the 
determination of attribution of obligations.”302 
  
 ii. External Actors’ Capacity.—The responsibility of international actors 
to protect people from gross violations of human rights presented by 
pandemics is triggered by the manifest failure of national authorities to afford 
that protection, and not whether that failure is due to a government’s 
incapacity or unwillingness. International action to prevent, treat, and control 
epidemic diseases by actors other than the affected state, where required, is 
based on a subsidiary duty in circumstances where the primary duty bearer 
lacks capacity or is unwilling to fulfill its obligations.303 This secondary duty 
is best understood as complementary to those of the rightsholder’s own state 
because any other reading would render meaningless the duty to cooperate in 
order to realize socioeconomic rights.304 
Thus, the proper inquiry once we have attributed the obligation to 
cooperate to an external actor is whether it had the capacity to abide by this 
obligation.305 If the external actor had the capacity to do so and failed to 
 
297. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps 
to the “Maximum of Available Resources” Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, ¶¶ 8, 10, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2007/1 (Sept. 21, 2007) (providing for the assessment of whether the measures 
taken by a state were adequate or reasonable). 
298. See, e.g., Cholera, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., https://www.usaid.gov/haiti/cholera 
[https://perma.cc/R28A-DPVQ] (noting that the Haitian government requested the U.S.’s assistance 
during the Cholera outbreak after confirming cases of the disease in 2010). 
299. For further discussion on how affected governments responded to the Ebola epidemic, see 
Sirleaf, supra note 22, at 503–12. 
300. Salomon, supra note 244, at 370. 
301. See Leif Wenar, Responsibility and Severe Poverty (arguing that even if a primary 
responsibility-holder is blameworthy, secondary responsibility can still be located in the person that 
can most easily bear that responsibility), in FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT: WHO 
OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR? 255, 265 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2007). 
302. VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 42, at 218. 
303. Salomon, supra note 244, at 370. 
304. Id. at 371. 
305. VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 42, at 218. 
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cooperate, then it can be held responsible. For example, the United States 
became the single largest government donor responding to Ebola by 
appropriating USD 5.4 billion in emergency funding, “the greatest amount of 
emergency funding ever provided by Congress for an international health 
emergency.”306 Almost all of this funding (USD 3.7 billion) was directed 
toward international activities for both the initial response and ongoing 
recovery and rebuilding efforts.307 When the Zika epidemic occurred, a 
significant amount of U.S. Ebola assistance was clawed back and repurposed 
for Zika.308 Despite the reduction of Ebola aid, this example is illustrative of 
an external state with capacity acting to cooperate towards combating a 
highly-infectious disease. It is emblematic of the special responsibility that 
economically developed states in the Global North have to assist poorer states 
in the Global South with epidemics.309 Indeed, the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights provides that special duties rest with 
actors that have more influence to conclude treaties and to make 
recommendations that can help to galvanize international action towards the 
achievement of socioeconomic rights.310 
A preliminary objection to this special responsibility is the problem of 
“insatiable entitlements.” Differentiating based on capacity may require 
social spending “long past the point where additional spending will do much 
good” and under circumstances where a claim can never be satisfied.311 This 
would present challenges where a state has not broadly secured the right to 
health at home but is expected to take steps to fulfill the right to health abroad. 
Nonetheless, highly-infectious diseases like Cholera and Ebola are not 
characterized by problems of too much spending. Limited resources for 
health, given other commitments, are already built into the current framework 
for socioeconomic rights. One way of addressing the “insatiable 
entitlements” problem is to require that any country that has realized the 
minimum essential levels of health domestically is then duty-bound to 
contribute to the realization of the same standard elsewhere before attempting 
to achieve the next highest attainable standard of health at home.312 Another 
 
306. JEN KATES ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE U.S. RESPONSE TO EBOLA: 
STATUS OF THE FY2015 EMERGENCY EBOLA APPROPRIATION 8 (2015), http://files.kff.org 
/attachment/Issue-Brief-The-US-Response-to-Ebola-Status-of-the-FY2015-Emergency-Ebola 
-Appropriation [https://perma.cc/5DYL-VLA2]. 
307. Id. at 3. 
308. E.g., Editorial Board, Opinion, Stealing from Ebola to Fight Zika, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/opinion/stealing-from-ebola-to-fight-zika.html?emc 
=eta1 [https://perma.cc/3WF8-NJPK]. 
309. See, e.g., General Comment No. 14, supra note 37, ¶ 40. 
310. ICESCR, supra note 39, art. 23. 
311. Mark S. Stein, Nussbaum: A Utilitarian Critique, 50 B.C. L. REV. 489, 500 (2009). 
312. See Ooms & Hammonds, supra note 222, at 36 (recognizing that if rich countries were to 
assist foreign countries only after optimal assistance had been achieved domestically, obligations to 
poorer countries may never become fulfilled). 
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solution would place the duty earlier, requiring any state that has not met the 
minimum levels of health domestically to comply with its obligations to 
others elsewhere so long as there are, objectively, resources to do so, and no 
retrogression as to the rights of people within its territory occurs as a result 
of foreign assistance.313 
  
 iii. Global Capacity.—The treaty-body responsible for interpreting the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stressed that because 
some diseases are “easily transmissible beyond the frontiers of a [s]tate, the 
international community has a collective responsibility to address this 
problem.”314 Responsibility for remedying highly-infectious diseases 
through the CBDR framework should take the form of capacity building 
(research and information sharing), technical assistance (training and the 
provision of expertise), and financial and material assistance through special 
funds with contributions from members to help defray costs. Private 
foundations and public–private partnerships will also be instrumental in 
capacity-building efforts. These initiatives are especially needed where states 
lack the infrastructure necessary to address epidemics domestically. 
The West African Ebola epidemic provides several illustrations of 
international actors demonstrating capacity to fulfill their collective 
responsibility. For example, the U.N.’s General Assembly called on 
“Member States, relevant United Nations bodies and the United Nations 
system to provide their full support to the United Nations Mission for Ebola 
Emergency Response,”315 which was an attempt to coordinate the response to 
the epidemic through a unified international structure.316 This was the 
institution’s first system-wide, emergency health mission. Its primary 
objective was to contain and prevent the spread of Ebola through case 
management and safe burial services, to treat infected individuals, and to 
provide services to affected communities.317 The U.N. praised it as an 
 
313. See Salomon, supra note 244, at 380 (suggesting a test whereby a state would be required 
to comply with obligations if sufficient resources were available, even though that state had not met 
minimum socioeconomic standards within its own state). 
314. General Comment No. 14, supra note 37, ¶ 40. 
315. G.A. Res. 69/1, ¶ 3 (Sept. 19, 2014). 
316. U.N. Secretary-General, Statement by the U.N. Secretary-General on the Establishment of 
the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) (Sept. 19, 2014), 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-09-19/statement-secretary-general-
establishment-united-nations-mission [https://perma.cc/M75K-D9W3]. 
317. U.N. Mission for Ebola Response (UNMEER), GLOBAL EBOLA RESPONSE, 
http://ebolaresponse.un.org/un-mission-ebola-emergency-response-unmeer 
[https://perma.cc/8RS3-Q4L9]. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3299483 
156 Texas Law Review [Vol. XX: ppp 
innovative approach, which will likely increase “as the nature of global 
responses are reshaped to meet the complex challenges of this century.”318 
During the peak of the Ebola epidemic, the Global Health Security 
Agenda was also created to facilitate collaborative capacity-building 
efforts.319 These efforts were aimed at achieving specific targets tied to the 
core capacities under the International Health Regulations.320 While the 
Regulations require the 196 state parties to cooperate to help build health 
capacities,321 they do not articulate how this is to work in practice. The GHSA 
fills in this lacuna by creating a system for countries to address their 
commitments. There are eleven action packages that are designed to help 
build state capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to threats posed by  
highly-infectious diseases.322 Under the GHSA, member countries can utilize 
a tool that helps to assess baseline national health security capacity. An action 
plan can then be tailored with a five-year target for states to meet, along with 
a set of indicators to measure progress and activities to support successful 
implementation. 
The GHSA reflects the CBDR framework by differentiating based on 
need,323 as well as capacity. Under it, member countries can reach their 
commitments by building capacity in their own nation, regionally, or 
globally. For example, the United States made a commitment to assist thirty-
one countries and the Caribbean Community.324 The United States has 
invested $1 billion in resources across seventeen of these countries, which 
need the most assistance with capacity building to detect and respond to 
future infectious disease outbreaks.325 The United States’ rationale for 
participating is simple: “[T]he most effective and least expensive way to 
protect Americans from diseases and other health threats that begin abroad is 
to stop them before they spread to our borders.”326 There is evidence 
 
318. UN Mission for Ebola Response Highlights New Type of UN Operation—Chef de Cabinet 
Tells UNMEER Staff, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.un.int/news/un-mission-
ebola-response-highlights-new-type-un-operation-chef-de-cabinet-tells-unmeer-staff 
[https://perma.cc/3DL6-DUT5]. 
319. See discussion supra subsection III(B)(2)(a). 
320. See INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS, supra note 31, Annex I(A). 
321. Id. Annex I(A)(3) (“State parties and WHO shall support assessments, planning and 
implementation processes . . . .”). 
322. The prevention action packages cover antimicrobial resistance, zoonotic diseases like 
Ebola, biosafety and biosecurity, and immunization. Action Packages, GLOB. HEALTH SEC. 
AGENDA, https://www.ghsagenda.org/packages [https://perma.cc/X5KV-YJSN]. The detection 
action packages address national laboratory systems, real-time surveillance, reporting, and 
workforce development. Id. The response packages focus on emergency operations centers, linking 
public health with law and multisector rapid response, and medical countermeasures and personnel 
deployment. Id. 
323. See discussion supra subsection III(B)(2)(a). 
324. ADVANCING THE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA, supra note 241. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. at 10. 
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suggesting that investments in promoting protective and primary care 
services in the Global South lead to large improvements in public health, 
generating benefits for other states like containment of epidemic diseases.327 
Additional donors, including the G-7 and G-20 leaders, as well as other donor 
countries and organizations, have provided a collective commitment to assist 
seventy-six countries to reach the capacities outlined in the International 
Health Regulations.328 The GHSA is based on the view that “[g]lobal health 
security is a shared responsibility that cannot be achieved by a single actor or 
sector of government.”329 However, neither the GHSA nor the Regulations 
determine how responsibility for capacity building should be allocated.330 
The CBDR framework can step in to fill in these gaps. 
Significant theoretical insights for the framework can be drawn from the 
analysis above. A nonexhaustive list of the factors that should be considered 
in distinguishing the capacity of actors includes economic, technical, and 
technological capacities and available resources, but also influence and 
ability to impact international decision-making.331 An additional factor that 
should be considered when differentiating capacity is the geographic distance 
of the external actor from the affected state.332 Thus, relative capacity, as 
opposed to absolute capacity, to act will be crucial in determining 
responsibility. 
This subsection makes the normative case for differentiating 
responsibility based on capacity. Differentiating based on capacity makes 
intuitive sense and is derived from human rights and global public health law. 
As with the other bases for differentiation examined above, this subsection 
maintains that capacity should not be considered in a vacuum when 
determining responsibility. 
 
327. Agnew, supra note 163, at 119. 
328. See INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS, supra note 31, Annex I(A), app. I. 
329. GHSA About, supra note 29. 
330. See Laurence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Ebola: A Crisis in Global Health Leadership, 
384 LANCET GLOBAL HEALTH 1323, 1323 (criticizing the WHO for its failure to allocate 
responsibility for capacity building prior to the Ebola outbreak). 
331. ETO CONSORTIUM, MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS princ. 31 (2013), 
https://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastricht-
principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23 [https://perma.cc/3A3H-4NQU] (suggesting 
that states have the obligation to fulfill extraterritorial rights commensurate to each state’s capacity 
in several given factors). 
332. Cf. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 430 (Feb. 26) (“This 
capacity itself depends, among other things, on the geographical distance of the State concerned 
from the scene of the events . . . .”). 
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IV. Theoretical and Policy Implications of Expanding CBDR to Combat 
Epidemics 
This Part resolves the inter- and intra-axis conflicts within the 
framework and explores the limits of diffusion, as well as the issues raised 
with operationalizing CBDR in hard and soft law. 
A. Differentiating Within CBDR 
  
 1. Resolving Inter-Axis Conflicts.—It is not clear which axis of 
differentiation, if any, should be determinative when allocating 
responsibility. Does one have precedence over the others? For example, if 
capacity alone was determinative, then actors that are especially capable 
would carry more burden even if their involvement to address a given 
epidemic would lack legitimacy. Action to remedy the harm caused by the 
Cholera epidemic in Haiti would be viewed as more sociologically legitimate 
were it to be the U.N. paying financial compensation to victims as opposed 
to say the EU, which has a more tenuous causal link to the Cholera epidemic. 
Should culpability have superiority? It may be nonsensical to privilege one 
axis for all time and in all places. Yet, leaving the framework entirely 
indeterminate may lead to similar problems with allocating responsibility 
witnessed with the conventional law of state responsibility and R2P. 
Accordingly, it is essential that further elaboration take place on whether 
the framework envisions a hierarchy. To this end, differentiating based on 
capacity must take precedence over other methods of differentiation. 
Differentiating based on capacity reflects obligations under human rights and 
global public health law. The positive duties that states have under both 
bodies of law to combat highly-infectious diseases are not based on a causal 
link or culpability. Differentiating based on culpability is secondary. The law 
of responsibility depends on a formal determination of culpability.333 
However, the CBDR framework does not, due to the numerous limitations 
for seeking redress internationally for violations experienced during 
epidemics through formal channels. For example, finding a venue with 
jurisdiction over actors implicated in pandemics that can exercise authority 
over relevant actors will be challenging in the best of circumstances. This is 
not to mention the difficulty that victims will have in recovering from 
respondents when seeking accountability for instances of shared 
responsibility. For instance, the contractor that improperly disposed of waste 
in Haiti likely did not have deep pockets, rendering it functionally judgment-
proof for its share of responsibility. The Cholera epidemic in Haiti indicates 
that not all culpable actors will be capable. Additionally, this framework is 
not simply concerned with the allocation of responsibility as a theoretical 
 
333. See VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 42, at 39 (discussing the limitations of state 
responsibility and the responsibility of international organizations). 
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matter. The objective is to further legal and institutional reform, rather than 
responsibility being purely punitive or even restorative. As such, culpability 
may be sufficient but not necessary for invoking CBDR. 
The culpability framework envisioned herein is extensive, going beyond 
what is legally required. It is not evident that this expansion of culpability to 
account for direct, indirect, and multiple causal factors, as well as historical 
culpability, will gain traction with stakeholders given propensities for blame 
avoidance and blame shifting. Yet, the aim is to involve not only those held 
legally responsible but also a wider community of culpable actors. The 
framework is deeply concerned with the practicalities of combating highly-
infectious diseases. Culpability as a secondary basis of differentiation reflects 
that normative judgment. 
The status of each axis of differentiation in law helps to impose 
hierarchy on the CBDR framework. As such, differentiation based on need is 
ranked last due to the hyper-contested nature of these duties. The normative 
justification for differentiation based on need is morally clear and sound. 
However, the legal duty to render aid or rescue has not been widely accepted. 
Differentiating based on need is also logistically difficult since the need may 
be acute in many places. Indeed, what of situations where there is capacity to 
act to combat a highly-infectious disease, but the need is not yet acute? 
Differentiating based on need should not be used as a straitjacket to limit 
preventative actions that could forestall greater calamity. Such a restrictive 
view may undermine capacity-building efforts aimed at the development of 
a comprehensive public health system with the surveillance needed for 
epidemic prevention. For example, the Global Health Security Agenda 
provides a useful model that incorporates both need and capacity as means 
of differentiation, while singling out Ebola and other highly pathogenic 
infectious diseases as its focus.334 As such, considering both the need to act, 
as well as another axis of differentiation will be instructive moving forward. 
The above analysis presents significant insights for the theoretical 
framework. Mainly, all the bases of differentiation should be considered 
cumulatively together. To this end, actors with capacity will be allocated the 
most responsibility towards combating highly-infectious diseases, then 
actors with culpability. Actors with capacity and culpability are to direct their 
efforts at combating highly-infectious diseases where there are the greatest 
health needs. The more capacity and culpability actors have, the more 
responsibility for combating epidemics and vice versa. Additionally, need is 
the only form of differentiation that should be paired with another aspect of 
the framework in practice. This is because the details of which actor(s) has 
the most responsibility for a given epidemic and how inter-axis conflicts 
should be resolved will necessarily be context-dependent. 
 
334. GHSA About, supra note 29. 
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 2. Resolving Intra-Axis Conflicts.—Another area for elaboration is how 
to resolve intra-axis conflicts within the framework. For example, it may be 
more socially desirable and legitimate for actors that have high capabilities 
(but are not the most capable globally) to act to remedy the harm caused by 
an epidemic disease. Otherwise, requiring action from only the most capable 
actors could reify geopolitical hierarchies in ways that allow for powerful 
actors to exercise oversight over programs aimed at highly-infectious 
diseases because they have more capacity than less powerful actors. This 
could serve to immunize more well-resourced actors from necessary health 
interventions, which would sustain a problematic role between countries in 
the Global South and Global North. To protect actors from unwarranted 
sovereignty incursions, the framework should require state consent for the 
provision of external assistance, with a stipulation that states cannot withhold 
consent without good cause.335 There is a rich foreign-aid literature that 
discusses the mismatch between donor and recipient countries’ priorities, 
with aid supplanting local needs.336 Donor governments and NGOs often 
direct aid to specific health projects and diseases through vertical projects 
like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.337 The role 
of the affected state in being able to articulate its needs and priorities is 
crucial.338 
Consequently, the framework must be flexible and sensitive to local 
conditions and should not be applied in a rigid fashion. The framework must 
be cognizant of local priorities for combatting epidemics to formulate 
contextually appropriate responses. Much more experimentation needs to be 
done to determine how the framework would work in practice. 
 
335. See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, Draft Articles 
on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, U.N. Doc. A/71/10, at 59 (2016) [hereinafter 
Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters] (suggesting a mandate that the 
provision of external assistance require consent). 
336. See Shoba Shukla, The Mismatch Between Donor Priorities and Global Health Needs, 
CITIZEN NEWS SERV. (Feb. 2013), http://www.citizen-news.org/2013/02/the-mismatch-between-
donor-priorities.html [https://perma.cc/WD3B-CVV5] (providing statistics on which countries need 
the most aid and comparing them to statistics on which countries receive the most aid). For further 
discussion on foreign aid, see generally, for example, PETER BURNELL, FOREIGN AID IN A 
CHANGING WORLD (1997) (arguing that the political value of aid to donors can “easily be 
overestimated” in part, for example, because donors pursue multiple competing objectives); BEN 
RAMALINGAM, AID ON THE EDGE OF CHAOS: RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN A 
COMPLEX WORLD (2013) (inquiring into the “black box” of foreign aid and arguing that aid 
agencies are increasingly operating within constraints through which they were not designed to 
navigate). 
337. See Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 110, at 140 (“Vertical programmes, such as the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, have undermined commitments to horizontal health 
system strengthening.”). 
338. See, e.g., Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, supra note 
335, at 15 (affected states have the “primary role in the direction, control, coordination, and 
supervision of . . . relief assistance”). 
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B. Diffusing CBDR to Combat Epidemics 
  
 The Limits of Diffusion.—The policy diffusion literature is vast.339 Policy 
diffusion describes the phenomenon where policy choices made in one place 
are influenced by the policy choices made elsewhere,340 which aptly 
characterizes the expansion of CBDR proposed herein. The policy diffusion 
literature cautions against the tendency to adopt policies from the “leaders 
even in the absence of evidence of the efficacy of those policies.”341 Yet, 
there are several reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the value of CBDR 
as a policy matter.  
First, disease eradication and ozone protection have similar problem-
and-solution structures. One of the reasons for the ozone regime’s success is 
because it involved a handful of chemicals with a small number of producers 
located primarily in the U.S. and Europe. These chemical companies quickly 
developed reasonably priced substitutes for ozone-depleting substances 
because the ozone treaties banned their trade and required their phasing 
out.342 
 
339. See, e.g., Erin Graham et al., The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research in Political 
Science, 43 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 673, 673 (2013) (noting that between 1958 and 2008, over eight 
hundred articles have been published in the field of political science on policy diffusion alone). 
340. Compare policy diffusion to legal transplants, which were originally defined as “the 
moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another, or from one people to another.” 
ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (1974). The 
legal transplant literature is wary of the notion that the law can be transplanted to further 
policymaking and legal reform efforts without regard to context. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., The 
Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 168, 171 (2003) (observing that “the social, economic 
and institutional context often differs remarkably between origin and transplant country” and that 
“transplants either adapted the law to local conditions and/or had a population that was familiar with 
the transplanted law”). This Article does not advocate a simple cut-and-paste of a principle from 
one area of law to another. Indeed, Part III went through great length to develop and expand the 
framework sensitive to the uniqueness of highly-infectious diseases. As such, the expanded 
framework of CBDR is not a “classic transplant” and should not suffer from problems associated 
with them. For example, when transplants are not adapted to local conditions, a “transplant effect” 
happens, wherein less effective legal institutions persist when compared to the origin country. See 
Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Osvaldo Saldías, Transplanting the European Court of Justice: 
The Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 629, 634–35 (2012) 
(discussing the contention of Berkowitz et al., supra, that a mismatch between local institutions and 
the transplanted law arises absent adaptation to local needs). 
341. Beth A. Simmons et al., Introduction: The Diffusion of Liberalization (discussing why the 
policy choices of rich, large, and proximate countries are emulated regardless of consequences), in 
THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 1, 35 (Beth A. Simmons et al. eds., 2008); 
see also KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION: HOW 
HEALTH, FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS SPREAD ACROSS COUNTRIES 4, 14–15 (2013) 
(discussing why the policy choices of rich, large, and proximate countries are emulated regardless 
of consequences). 
342. Montreal Protocol, supra note 186, art. 2 (listing specific ozone-depleting substances and 
targets for phasing them out); id. art. 3 (regulating both production and consumption of ozone-
depleting substances); id. art. 4 (banning state parties from importing or exporting these substances 
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Similarly, disease eradication efforts should also target the producers. 
The global pharmaceutical market is expected to reach USD 1.3 trillion by 
2020,343 mostly from revenue generated and controlled from companies with 
headquarters in the Global North. The international intellectual property 
regime’s grant of monopoly rights to pharmaceuticals for twenty years344 
impedes pharmaceutical research and the development process for  
highly-infectious diseases that are not profitable. Pharmaceutical companies 
depend on charging monopoly prices to recover their investment in 
experimental drugs and technologies. This system does not incentivize the 
development of drugs to treat diseases that disproportionately impact people 
in the Global South. 
Patent holders charge varying prices in different jurisdictions. The 
intellectual property regime places limits on parallel importation, which 
occurs where parties purchase goods in one state and then resell them in a 
second state without the patent holder’s consent.345 This prevents countries 
in the Global South from accessing essential medicines at more affordable 
prices. The flexibilities in the intellectual property regime that allow for 
compulsory licensing are also insufficient.346 Indeed, compulsory licensing 
is of little use to states with limited-to-no manufacturing capabilities to 
produce essential generic drugs at more affordable prices for their home 
markets.347 
Changing the incentive structures for the research and development of 
drugs, as well as making generic and affordable versions of drugs more 
widely available, should aid efforts to eradicate highly-infectious diseases. 
The ozone regime indicates that changing the incentive structures prompted 
companies to develop cheaper substitutes, and with these substitutes, more 
countries stopped using ozone-depleting substances and traded in products 
 
to non-parties); see also London Amendments, supra note 188, art. 2 (accelerating the phasing out 
of existing substances and adding new substances). 
343. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PHARMA 2020: THE VISION—WHICH PATH WILL YOU 
TAKE? 5 (2007). 
344. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 216, art. 33. 
345. See International Exhaustion and Parallel Importation, WORLD INT’L PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/export/international_exhaustion.htm 
[https://perma.cc/A8PH-RSZ6] (defining parallel importation as the importation “of goods outside 
the distribution channels contractually negotiated by the manufacturer”). 
346. The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 216, art. 31, permits compulsory licensing, but only 
where the proposed user makes efforts to obtain authorization from the patent holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions, which must be unsuccessful for a reasonable period. The 
requirement can be waived where there is a state of national emergency or other circumstance of 
extreme urgency in cases of public noncommercial use. The Doha Declaration sought to clarify that 
the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect 
public health and that it should be interpreted as compatible in a manner that promotes access to 
medicines. Doha Declaration, supra note 215, ¶ 4. 
347. The Doha Declaration recognized this and asked the TRIPS Council to find solutions. 
Doha Declaration, supra note 215, ¶ 6. 
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that contained them. For example, the ozone treaty regime was initially 
focused on sharing information and scientific research.348 Later, the 
obligations became more stringent with strict timetables for phasing out 
dependence on harmful ozone-depleting substances, as well as adding new 
substances to be phased out.349 In the future, it is possible that the CBDR 
framework to combat highly-infectious diseases might develop along the 
same lines. Thus, there is reason to be enthusiastic about the potential 
efficacy of an expanded CBDR framework for combating epidemics. 
Furthermore, CBDR may resonate more in global public health than in 
the international environmental regime. While environmental problems like 
climate change can be slow-moving with the most harmful effects predicted 
for generations from now, epidemic diseases tend to engender visceral fear 
in the present. Indeed, the tendency for some pandemics to take on a hyper-
visible or spectacular quality means that an expanded CBDR approach may 
be especially useful for highly-infectious diseases. For example, the Global 
Health Security Agenda was shaped during the height of the Ebola epidemic 
not only to combat that disease but also other “highly pathogenic infectious 
diseases.”350 The success of this initiative indicates that state practice is 
evolving to recognize the importance of a coordinated response to  
highly-infectious diseases. Thus, it is likely that the specter of other 
epidemics may similarly galvanize actors towards additional international 
action. 
C. Operationalizing CBDR Utilizing Hard and Soft Law 
  
 1. Towards a Comprehensive Treaty Regime.—Concerns about the 
usefulness of CBDR may be heightened because its status as binding law is 
robustly debated.351 Whether a customary international law norm352 has 
formed on CBDR—separate from treaty law—or whether CBDR is a form 
of soft law that is nonbinding is irrelevant for this project. This Article draws 
inspiration from the under-theorized norm of CBDR in international 
 
348. See Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer art. 2, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 
U.N.T.S. 293 (creating a group to form a protocol that addresses updated scientific and economic 
research). 
349. London Amendments, supra note 188, art. 2A–2E (setting forth a timetable for phasing 
out use of ozone-depleting substances and identifying new substances to be phased out). 
350. GHSA About, supra note 29. 
351. Susan Biniaz, Assistant Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks on Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility (Mar. 13–16, 2002) (citing four reasons for why the CBDR principle 
has not been helpful), in Introduction, 96 PROC. OF THE ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.) 358, 
361. 
352. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) 
(defining customary international law as requiring a state to follow its generalized practice out of a 
sense of legal obligation). 
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environmental law and substantially develops it as a framework to inform 
progressive developments in global public health. Thus, clarity on the legal 
status of CBDR in international environmental law is unnecessary for its 
expansion, development, and application. 
Although a CBDR framework for combating highly-infectious diseases 
might seem attractive on a theoretical level, skeptics may believe that it is 
impossible for this approach to be operationalized. First, there are few treaties 
regulating infectious diseases.353 Also, states seem to have little appetite for 
additional treaty-making in global public health as compared to the 
international environmental regime.354 In addition, due to the responsibility 
gaps discussed above,355 many of the relevant nonstate actors would fall 
outside of any potential treaty regime and would not be bound by any such 
obligations. 
Additionally, if the climate change regime’s negotiations on emissions 
levels are an indication, resulting decisions would be based on what was 
politically feasible and would have little to do with ethical or scientific 
considerations.356 As such, treaty negotiations for an expanded CBDR 
framework would likely lead to a lowest common denominator not 
necessarily reflective of scientific best practices. It may be that linking the 
three bases of differentiation erects a substantial hurdle to subsequent legal 
adoption. Thus, one might expect any deliberations concerning diffusing the 
CBDR framework to privilege the status quo, given the international 
community’s limited willingness to mandate the redistribution of economic 
resources as a political matter. Accordingly, this Article does not advocate 
for the development of a treaty regime as an initial matter. However, because 
so much of the expanded CBDR framework is derived from existing law, a 
comprehensive treaty to implement the framework may not be necessary. 
  
 2. Towards a Soft-Law Regime.—A myriad of explanations exists as to 
why a soft-law regime makes sense as a starting place. First, operationalizing 
the framework through norms of conduct understood as legally nonbinding, 
or soft law, is achievable in the immediate future. Soft-law commitments may 
be more politically realistic because they do not require that all actors be 
 
353. See generally, e.g., International Sanitary Regulations, May 25, 1951, 7 U.S.T. 2255 
(standardizing international quarantine regulations regarding Cholera, yellow fever, and plague); 
International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation, Dec. 15, 1944, 59 Stat. 991, 16 U.N.T.S. 
247 (protecting against the spread of disease via air travel); International Convention for Mutual 
Protection Against Dengue Fever, July 25, 1934, 177 L.N.T.S. 59 (resolving to take steps against 
the spread of dengue fever); International Agreement Relating to Facilities to be Accorded to 
Merchant Seamen in the Treatment of Venereal Diseases, Dec. 1, 1924, 78 L.N.T.S. 351 (agreeing 
to provide medical treatment in ports where seamen might be treated for venereal diseases); 
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS, supra note 31. 
354. Compare sources cited supra note 353, with sources cited supra notes 165–73. 
355. See discussion supra subpart III(B). 
356. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 179, arts. 3, 10, annex I (explaining that Annex I 
states have differentiated targets based on negotiated outcome). 
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incorporated into a single treaty. Soft law also does not necessarily have to 
accommodate the varying positions of different actors. When there are 
disagreements among states or uncertainties about how to achieve an agreed-
upon goal, a comprehensive treaty regime could result in a race to the bottom 
to get the most parties on board, while a soft-law approach would not. 
Moreover, soft-law commitments also offer significant advantages, such 
as flexibility and adaptability, when compared to comprehensive treaty 
regimes. Because the expanded CBDR framework is still in its infancy, a 
soft-law approach can act like a “trial balloon.” Soft law allows actors to 
maintain some freedom of action should situations change, since soft law can 
be easily amended and adapted to meet the needs of parties. For instance, soft 
law is far less cumbersome than the treaty amendment process. The treaty 
negotiation process can be long and unwieldy with lags in the development 
of implementation mechanisms. Yet, because soft law does not require 
formal domestic approval or ratification, discussions can be less contentious 
than treaty making, which requires the approval of domestic actors. Thus, 
soft-law commitments can develop quite rapidly and be used quickly to 
address highly-infectious diseases immediately. 
The normative underpinnings of the CBDR framework have been 
expressed in soft law in the pledge to “leave no one behind,” the central theme 
of the 2030 Agenda, which seeks to place an obligation on everyone to reach 
those in situations of conflict, disaster, vulnerability, and risk.357 CBDR has 
also been referenced in World Health Assembly committee meetings 
regarding the health effects of air pollution.358 The most concrete 
instantiation of the CBDR framework is reflected in the Global Health 
Security Agenda, discussed above.359 The GHSA has been operating since 
2014 and capitalizes on the more participatory nature of soft law. 
Conventionally, formal treaty making and customary-law creation in 
international law are both state-centric enterprises. Soft law allows for the 
participation of nonstate actors, which would be highly desirable for 
addressing epidemics due to the significant role that nonstate actors play in 
global public health. The GHSA reflects soft law’s quick adaptability to 
respond to highly-infectious diseases, given its formation during the Ebola 
outbreak. 
Also, soft law could work to create expectations that influence the 
actions of state and nonstate actors towards compliance. The main 
disadvantage presented by relying on soft law is that there could be less 
credible commitments by states since it is nonbinding. The framework can 
 
357. Secretary-General of the World Humanitarian Summit, One Humanity: Shared 
Responsibility, ¶ 72, U.N. Doc. A/70/709 (Feb. 2, 2016). 
358. World Health Organization, Summary Records of Committees from the Sixty-Eighth 
World Health Assembly, U.N. Doc. WHA68/2015/REC/3, at 83 (2015). 
359. See discussion supra subsections III(B)(2)(a), III(B)(2)(c). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3299483 
166 Texas Law Review [Vol. XX: ppp 
be shaped to reflect, and hopefully help form, a standard of appropriate 
conduct. Soft law would allow participants to determine what aspects of the 
framework are worth keeping and what needs to be modified before the 
expanded CBDR framework is completely memorialized. 
The informality of soft law presents both an opportunity and a challenge 
for progressive development. Powerful actors can apply and enforce their 
preferred aspects of the framework to try to push the development of the law 
in one direction. This can occur even without a clear consensus on which 
aspects of the framework are favorable or unworkable. However, if the 
CBDR framework develops as soft law only, this may hinder the 
development of binding obligations because actors may be disincentivized to 
do more when they can do less. It is not evident that adopting a CBDR 
framework for combating epidemics would necessarily lead to that outcome. 
Indeed, it could also create expectations that impact the activities of actors in 
a way that fosters commitments without treaties, or treaty bodies, to coerce 
compliance. 
Most optimistically, the CBDR framework could eventually induce 
meaningful change in the behavior of relevant stakeholders, which could lay 
the groundwork for a comprehensive treaty or the development of a 
customary international law obligation. Otherwise, at a minimum, 
compliance can be obtained through the framework via cooperative, 
interactive processes of justification, discourse, and persuasion. Whether the 
law will develop along the lines proposed is an open question. 
Notwithstanding, this Article demonstrates that an expanded CBDR 
framework for combating epidemics is worthy of progressive development 
in law and practice. 
V. Conclusion 
Epidemics are the result of the actions of multiple actors, which 
necessitates the comprehensive allocation of responsibility. Yet, the 
traditional framework for responsibility and the emerging norm of R2P are 
inadequate for addressing highly-infectious diseases. First, both the 
traditional principles of responsibility and R2P perpetuate the fallacy that 
states can cope on their own with structural problems, including the increased 
incidence of epidemics. Conventional approaches to responsibility are 
untenable for the realities of today’s world wherein responsibility needs to be 
distributed to several states and nonstate actors.360 The traditional framework 
is also wanting due to its narrow conception of causality. Moreover, the 
traditional responsibility doctrine is too state-centric in terms of both 
accountholders and power wielders.361 The state-centric nature of R2P 
similarly fails to recognize that the structural conditions that give rise to R2P 
 
360. See VANDENBOGAERDE, supra note 42, at 40 (discussing the limitations of international 
responsibility). 
361. See id. at 41. 
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situations are not divorced from the “international community.” R2P also 
privileges direct harms occasioned by civil and political violations over and 
above structural harms occasioned by socioeconomic violations. Moreover, 
both the traditional principles of responsibility and R2P fail to adequately 
distribute responsibility. 
Given the limitations of the law of responsibility and R2P, this Article 
argues for a new vision of responsibility. It develops the theory underlying 
CBDR and makes the case for expansion of the framework to the challenges 
posed by epidemics. This Article articulates the distinctive normative bases 
for differentiating responsibilities based on need, culpability, and capacity. 
This framework better distributes responsibility and is less state-centric than 
rival norms of responsibility. It accounts for structural inequality in ways that 
other frameworks do not. It also does not reify the false hierarchy between 
civil and political rights and economic and social rights that exists in other 
areas. Moreover, it recognizes and accounts for the significant role of 
nonstate actors and provides a basis for holding such actors responsible, as 
opposed to pretending that only states are responsible for the increased 
incidence of epidemics. The CBDR framework is superior for dealing with 
highly-infectious diseases. It does not come with R2P’s baggage or the risks 
of the extraordinary responses utilized under R2P. Furthermore, the CBDR 
framework distributes responsibility far more comprehensively than extant 
regimes. 
The expanded CBDR framework represents “part of a broader 
normative” push that “requires action on the part of those in a position to 
assist.”362 CBDR also hints at an emerging requirement for states to 
coordinate their efforts with each other to effectively “discharge their 
respective obligations to cooperate.”363 The expanded CBDR framework is 
significant for the progressive development of global public health law. It 
also shifts the conceptualization of responsibility in fundamental ways. 
There are valid concerns about diffusing this framework from 
addressing environmental problems to combating epidemics. States are not 
consistently adhering to capacity-building commitments in international 
environmental law. This generates uneasiness because it may be that they 
will be even less willing to address problems presented by epidemics through 
the framework. In the end, it may be that state and nonstate actors are roused 
to address highly-infectious diseases, not necessarily because of an 
acknowledgement of the need. Undeniably, the idea that actors should help 
others in need is not new.364 Mobilization in the Global South has taken place 
 
362. Salomon, supra note 244, at 378 (internal quotations omitted). 
363. Id. at 378–79. 
364. See, e.g., U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rep. on the Relationship Between 
Climate Change and Human Rights, ¶¶ 84–85, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009) (calling for 
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for years to get actors in the Global North to address global inequities in 
health and other areas. 
Moreover, actors may not even necessarily be motivated to action 
because of a recognition of culpability for an epidemic. This has certainly 
been witnessed with the U.N. in Haiti. Yet, motivation may similarly be 
lacking to combat epidemics even with the recognition of capacity to act and 
ameliorate harm. Certainly, actors in the Global North routinely reject an 
obligation to provide foreign assistance,365 irrespective of capacity. For 
example, while states express support in principle for the notion that 0.7% of 
their GNI should routinely go towards development assistance, few states 
meet that goal.366 Given this, there may be skepticism about the traction the 
expanded CBDR framework will have with relevant stakeholders. 
Nonetheless, there is reason for cautious optimism about the prospects 
of success of this framework. CBDR is consistent with theoretical and 
existing foundations of law where responsibility is tethered to an actor’s 
conduct and relationship to the harm through culpability. However, the 
framework does not treat the culpability model as a legal straitjacket and 
envisions a broad understanding of causation—direct, indirect, and historical. 
Additionally, the framework differentiates based on capacity, which is 
derived from human rights and global public health law. It also draws on 
extralegal incentives, building on moral and political conceptualizations of 
responsibility towards those in need. In this way, the approach functions as a 
three-headed dragon, with multiple methods of galvanizing action to attack 
epidemics. 
Through interactive processes, the norms underlying the CBDR 
framework can be invoked, interpreted, and elaborated in ways that generate 
pressure for compliance through soft law. Most hopefully, a CBDR approach 
to combating epidemics could be accepted as a normative framework that 
could serve as a precursor for the later creation of “hard” or binding 
 
the cooperation of the international community to address climate change); Michael Marmot et al., 
Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of 
Health, 372 LANCET 1661, 1665 (2008) (singing the praises of “intersectoral action for health—
coordinated policy and action among health and non-health sectors”). 
365. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Open-Ended Working Group to Consider 
Options Regarding the Elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its Second Session, ¶ 76, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/52 
(Feb. 10, 2005) (reporting that the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Canada, France, and 
Portugal did not believe that international cooperation and assistance was a legal entitlement); Philip 
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Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755, 777 (2005) 
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assistance). 
366. See, e.g., MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL GAP TASK FORCE, UNITED NATIONS, THE 
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that out of twenty-three countries, only Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands met the 0.7% development assistance goal). 
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international law.367 The world is contending with the increasing incidence 
and severity of a wide range of highly-infectious diseases. The ease with 
which these diseases can spread in the wake of disasters and without makes 
it likely that state and nonstate action will be stimulated in this area out of a 
common self-interest. The GHSA is currently harnessing states’ shared self-
interest to work to address the threats posed by highly-infectious diseases and 
is differentiating based on capacity and need. As such, a CBDR approach to 
epidemics is already functioning in practice. The findings from this Article 
will hopefully be used to help inform wider discussions in this area to aid 
with developing law and policy governing responsibility for, and risk 
reduction of, pandemic diseases. 
 
 
367. This has happened multiple times in human rights, of which the most prominent example 
is the nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (enumerating thirty universal human rights 
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